The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text
of Article III
John Harrisont

SECTION 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
SECTION 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
of another State;-between Citizens of different States,between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
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Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.'
In the eighteenth century there was a vogue for solving difficult practical problems with complex mechanisms. America's
Constitution is such a mechanism. One practical problem to
which the Constitution's solution is especially complex is that of
law and courts in a federal system, which involves the Constitution's primary sources of intricacy, federalism, and separation of
powers. One of the most debated separation of powers questions
that arises in this context concerns the extent of Congress's
power under Article III to limit the federal courts' jurisdiction.
Focusing on the language of the Constitution, and ignoring as
much as possible the gloss that has developed, this article defends the traditional view that Congress's authority is substantial.
Part I outlines the debate over the congressional power to
limit jurisdiction and describes the current controversy over the
bearing of the text on that debate. Part II then shows how a close
reading of Article III's language leads most naturally to the traditional view and argues that there are severe textual difficulties
with the competing readings. Part III considers the claim that
the Constitution's overall structure implies a more restricted
congressional power over jurisdiction. I reject that claim, arguing
that the constitutional structure underdetermines such matters
of fine detail.
I. THE DEBATE OVER JURISDICTION LIMITATION
Most of the time Congress treats the federal courts as its
partners in government. For example, some of Congress's most
memorable assertions of central authority, like the Force Act of
1833 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, involved expansions of
federal judicial competence.2 There is also, however, this matter
of judicial review, which sometimes makes Congress wish that
federal judicial competence were not quite as broad as it is. The
two-edged nature of the relationship between Congress and the
federal courts came out most clearly during Reconstruction,
when Congress, while expanding the reach of federal judicial
power, simultaneously manipulated the jurisdictional statutes in
order to delay or prevent a pronouncement by the Supreme Court

2

US Const, Art III. Section 2 concludes by providing for jury trial in criminal cases.
Force Act of 1833 § 3, 4 Stat 632, 633-34; Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 3, 14 Stat 27,
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on the constitutionality of dubious legislation.3 Discussions of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts thus involve the questions of
both the maximum scope that Congress may give it and the
minimum scope to which Congress is permitted to shrink it.
The first phase of the current academic discussion of congressional power to limit federal jurisdiction began with Henry
Hart's Dialogue. 4 For many years no one urged that the text of
Article III itself might dispose of the issue, certainly not that the
text would dispose of the issue by denying or limiting congressional power. It seemed to be long-standing practice that the federal judiciary did not have all the jurisdiction it might have under the Constitution. Moreover, the Supreme Court had said that
Congress's power over the jurisdiction of the inferior federal judiciary was plenary in Sheldon v Sill.' Finally, the Court had also
indicated a broad sweep for Congress's power, derived from the
Exceptions Clause, to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.6 To academics for whom practice and precedent
meant a great deal, and the unglossed text fairly little, the question seemed settled.
Instead, the debate proceeded on other terms. Hart himself
thought the overall structure of the Constitution put some limits
on Congress's power over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.7 Lawrence Sager, years after Hart, made essentially structural arguments for even stronger limitations.8 Other commentators, such
as Laurence Tribe, have focused on the ways in which substantive limitations on the government-the "individual rights" provisions of the Constitution-could invalidate congressional at' See William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ariz L Rev
229, 233-44 (1973).
' Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362 (1953). Further citation to the Dialogue will be to the third edition of Hart's casebook, Paul M. Bator, et al, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the FederalSystem 393-423 (Foundation 3d ed 1988)
("Hart and Wechsler"), which is more accessible.
Because the academic discussion of this subject is notoriously extensive, I will try to
cite only those articles that bear directly on the subject.
49 US (8 How) 441, 448-49 (1850).
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US (7 Wall) 506, 513-14 (1868). The Exceptions Clause is US
Const, Art III, § 2, cl 2.
' Hart and Wechsler at 394 (cited in note 4). Hart's argument was to some extent textual, in that he was interpreting the word "exceptions," but his proposed standard was essentially structural: "The measure is simply that the exceptions must not be such as will
destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." Id. The Supreme Court's essential function, if it has one, must be deduced from the design of the
Constitution as a whole.
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 42-68
(1981).
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tempts to curtail federal jurisdiction.? The textual reading underlying this debate-according to which Article III grants Congress broad power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and complete power over the lower courts' jurisdiction-has
come to be referred to as the orthodox, or traditional, interpretation.
Another phase of the debate opened when Robert Clinton
sought to awaken a thesis that had slept through most of the Republic's history. ° He maintains that Article III itself, as originally understood, contains the answers to all these questions. According to Clinton, some federal court, supreme or inferior, must
be available to hear and decide every lawsuit described in the list
of cases and controversies in Section 2 of Article III. Congress,
says Clinton, may use its power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction only if it makes sure that
the excepted cases come within the jurisdiction of some lower
federal court: No cases or controversies may be lost, except perhaps a minimal set dropped out for reasons of practical convenience."
Clinton calls his a mandatory theory, apparently for two reasons. First, following Justice Story, he characterizes the Vesting
Clause of Article III as a command-a mandate-to Congress. To
him, "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested"
means "Congress is hereby commanded to vest the judicial power
of the United States." 2 Second, the theory proposes a mandatory
' See Laurence H. Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering:Zoning Disfavored Rights
Out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 129, 139-52 (1981). Tribe's article, like
much of the academic discussion, was in response to legislative proposals to limit federal
jurisdiction on certain controversial topics.
" See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Guided
Quest for the OriginalUnderstandingofArticle III, 132 U Pa L Rev 741 (1984); Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:Early Implementation of and
Departuresfrom the ConstitutionalPlan, 86 Colum L Rev 1515 (1986).
" Clinton deduces from the text that the framers
intended to mandate that Congress allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole each
and every type of case or controversy defined as part of the judicial power of the
United States by section 2, clause 1 of article III, excluding, possibly, only those
cases that Congress deemed to be so trivial that they would pose an unnecessary
burden on both the federal judiciary and on the parties forced to litigate in federal
court.
Clinton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 749-50 (cited in note 10) (footnote omitted). The exceptions
power "was at most an allocative authority designed to facilitate the creation of inferior
federal courts." Id at 753.
2 See id at 749-50. As mentioned, the main source of this theory is Justice Story's
opinion in Martin v Hunter's Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816):
The language of [ I article [III] throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory
upon the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that congress could not,
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reading in that the Constitution on this issue is mandatory
rather than empowering; instead of authorizing Congress to
make decisions about federal jurisdiction, the Constitution
makes those decisions itself. In his view, "The judicial power
shall extend to" means "The jurisdiction of the federal courts
must include." 3
Among the objections to Clinton's thesis is that it would fill
the federal courts with diversity cases. Shortly after Clinton's
first article appeared, Akhil Amar sought to save the mandatory
theory from itself by developing a version that would avoid such
a result.'4 Amar agrees with Clinton that the Vesting Clause is
an order to Congress that it do something, and that the beginning of Section 2 may properly be paraphrased as "The jurisdiction of some federal court must extend to .... .""s He keeps the diversity floodgates closed, however, by picking up on a hint from
Justice Story; Amar maintains that there are two tiers of Article
III jurisdiction, one mandatory, the other permissive. He uses the
word "all" as a mandatory-jurisdiction detector, noting that the
first three heads of jurisdiction in Section 2 of Article III are described to include "all cases," while the other's include only
"controversies."16
According to Amar, when "all" appears three times and then
disappears, its subsequent absence is freighted with meaning.
The fact that "all" is missing tells the perceptive reader that the
contrary of "all" is actually there, even though that contrary is
not expressed. In this context, the contrary of "all" is "some." So
we move from (1) "all cases... all cases ... all cases ... contro-

without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it into operation. The judicial
power of the United States shall be vested (not may be vested) in one supreme court,
and in such inferior courts as congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.
Could congress have lawfully refused to create the supreme court, or to vest in it the
constitutional jurisdiction?... The judicial power must, therefore, be vested in some
court, by congress; and to suppose that it was not an obligation binding on them, but
might, at their pleasure, be omited or declined, is to suppose that, under the sanction of the constitution, they might defeat the constitution itself; a construction
which would lead to such a result cannot be sound.
Id at 328-29 (emphasis added to "may"). The foregoing was dictum.
See Clinton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 753-54 (cited in note 10).
See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,65 BU L Rev 205 (1985). Arnar has since elaborated his position and defended it against critics. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the
OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court,56 U Chi L Rev 443 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Two-Tiered Structureof the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 138 U Pa L Rev 1499 (1990); Akhil
Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated.A Reply, 138 U Pa L Rev 1651
(1990).
Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 231-32, 239 (cited in note 14).
Id at 240-41.
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versies . ..controversies," to (2) "all cases .. .all cases . . .all
cases ...[not-all] controversies ...[not-all] controversies," to (3)
"all cases .. all cases ... all cases . . .[some] controversies ...
[some] controversies." The Extending Clause thus means that the
jurisdiction of some federal court must include all the cases mentioned and some of each of the kinds of controversies.' 7
Following his textualism to its logical conclusion, Amar says
that some federal court must have jurisdiction over at least two
lawsuits in each of the controversy-denominated heads of jurisdiction.18 To the complaint that his interpretation makes Article
III a piece of secret writing, comprehensible only with magnifying glass, Rosetta Stone, and a powerful imagination, Amar rejoins that his approach makes sense of every word. He can account for the presence and absence of the word "all" in a way that
orthodox readings cannot. It takes a reading of the text, Amar
maintains, to beat a reading of the text. 9
This Article presents the reading he invites. It complements
an earlier critique of Amar's position by Daniel Meltzer. Meltzer
focuses especially on the Federal Convention and the first Congress and takes issue with Amar's historical claims concerning
the understanding of Article III around the time of the framing.
He also deals briefly with the textual problem, questioning the
premise that an extension of the judicial power is the same thing
as an extension of jurisdiction and suggesting that the switch
from "all cases" to "controversies" may reflect a usage according
to which controversies included only civil suits while cases included all legal proceedings.' This Article develops and supports
those possibilities in greater detail and provides a close textual
criticism of the mandatory reading of the Extending Clause as
well as of Amar's division between mandatory and permissive
tiers of jurisdictional categories.
I then discuss the constitutional structure-the sum of all
the texts-to which Amar also appeals. It is true that the federal
courts are an independent branch of the national government
and that the tenure of federal judges is different from that of
judges in many States. From that, however, we can infer nothing
about the extent to which the Constitution authorizes Congress

"See id at 242; Amar, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1652 (cited in note 14).
"Amar, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1652-53 (cited in note 14).
See id at 1655-56.
Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U Pa L Rev 1569
(1990).
" Id at 1573-74 n 14 (discussing Vesting and Extending Clauses); id at 1575-76 (Cases
include criminal prosecutions; controversies do not.).
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to limit federal jurisdiction. General principles, including those
reflected in the constitutional structure, do not answer specific
design questions.2
II. ARTICLE III
Before counting leaves on the trees I will sketch the forest.
According to the traditional understanding of Article III, Congress enjoys substantial power over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Its authority over the inferior federal courts is, considered
in itself, as plenary as the commerce power. Congress may give
them all the jurisdiction the Constitution permits, or none at all,
or anything in between, as far as Article III is concerned. Other
constitutional limitations, when applicable, restrict that power
as they may restrict any power of Congress. As for the Supreme
Court, Congress may not add to or subtract from its original jurisdiction, although it may, within the limits of Article III, create
concurrent jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts. The congressional power to make exceptions from the Court's appellate
jurisdiction is, in itself, limited only insofar as some limitations
might be so large as no longer to constitute exceptions. Once
again, the exceptions power is subject to any external constitutional limitations that may apply.
Here is the reading of the text that leads to that conclusion.
Article III proceeds in three steps, in descending order of generality. Section 1 begins with the Vesting Clause. It provides that

' This paper deals with Article III and does not discuss two issues that often come up
in this context. First, I do not consider the interaction between Congress's exceptions
power and the various constitutional limitations, such as the First Amendment. In Gerald Gunther's terminology, this piece deals only with internal and not with external restraints on congressional power. See Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail
Federal Court Jurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan L Rev
895, 900 (1984).
Second, I do not consider the thesis that certain government actions, especially deprivations of life, liberty, or property, must be accomplished through judicial, rather than
executive or legislative, power. This principle, which may derive either from the separation of powers or from the Due Process Clause, see Murray's Lessee v Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co, 59 US (18 How) 272, 275, 280-81 (1855) (While "due process of law"
usually requires that judicial proceedings be conducted by judicial officers, there are exceptions, such as the Treasury Department's seizure of a delinquent tax collector's property.), may limit Congress's power to "preclude judicial review" of executive actions-that
is, to provide that the executive may engage in certain activity and that no court shall
have jurisdiction to give a remedy for what the executive has done, see Webster v Doe, 486
US 592, 601-05 (1988) (holding that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims based on termination of employment with the Central Intelligence
Agency-any such intent must be clear, since it would raise a "serious constitutional
question"). Such questions are separate from those concerning Congress's power over federal jurisdiction per se.
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there is to be a single highest federal court, as there is to be a
single President, and that there may or may not be lower federal
courts, as Congress decides. Whatever federal courts there are
have the power to decide cases and controversies for the national
government because they have the judicial power, just as the
President has the executive power. The tenure and salary provision, which applies to all federal judges, sets their term of office
and limits Congress's power over their compensation.
Section 1 is quite abstract, so abstract that it does not even
tell us which lawsuits the federal judiciary may decide. The Extending Clause, the first paragraph of Section 2, answers that
question. It does so with respect to both the Supreme Court and
the inferior courts, because it speaks of the extent of the judicial
power, which the Constitution vests in both. The clause provides
a list of lawsuits that may be decided by federal courts. It thus
performs a vital function in a constitution of enumerated powers
by setting out the maximum level of federal judicial authority.
Part of the way through, the clause switches from enumerating
"all cases" to enumerating "controversies." Cases include all legal
actions, criminal and civil, while controversies include only civil
proceedings. The word "all" appears before "cases" for two reasons. First, it stresses both the comprehensive reach of "cases"
and the restricted reach of "controversies." Second, it confirms
the breadth of the national judicial authority in the new federal
system, indicating that under the case-denominated heads of jurisdiction the federal courts may take the seemingly unusual
step of adjudicating state criminal proceedings.
The level of abstraction so far is still fairly high because we
do not know anything about the actual jurisdiction of any court.
The second paragraph of Section 2 addresses jurisdiction, in part
explicitly and in part implicitly. It explicitly sets out the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which Congress is nowhere
given power to change. It also sets out the Court's appellate jurisdiction, which is comprehensive but subject to a congressional
power to make exceptions. Section 2 says nothing about the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. All we know is that Congress is free to constitute such of them as it sees fit. The inference is that their jurisdiction, within the scope of the federal judicial power, is to be determined when Congress exercises that
authority. The result is that the actual sweep of federal jurisdiction is, like many other questions under the Constitution, subject
to substantial congressional discretion.
Now for the trees and leaves.

Limiting FederalJurisdiction
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A. The Vesting Clause
The Vesting Clause of Article III lays down a number of
rules. Most important are those that help to establish the separation of powers. By providing that the federal judicial power be
held by the courts of the United States, it implies that no other
institution of government, whether established by the Constitution, by Congress pursuant to the Constitution, or by a State,
may exercise that power. It also authorizes the federal courts to
exercise the judicial power; as we learn in Section 2, these courts
are to do so by deciding cases and controversies. Moreover, the
clause implies that there is to be a supreme court and provides
that there is to be only one such institution.
The Vesting Clause is a self-executing enactment; it lays
down rules by saying what shall be. It is equivalent to "The judicial power of the United States is hereby vested in one supreme
court ....

"

Contrary to the mandatory theories, however, the

Vesting Clause of Article III is not a command that Congress vest
power in the courts. This appears from an examination of the
parallel clause of Article I, which provides, "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States." That is not a command that Congress vest itself with
power, unless we are to believe that the legislature is capable of
lifting itself by its bootstraps, giving itself power before it has
power to do anything, including give itself power.
Moreover, whatever might be the extent of Congress's power
with respect to the inferior courts, an examination of the text belies the claim that Congress could vest the judicial power in the
Supreme Court. The text grants Congress no power that applies
specifically to the Court other than the authority to except from
and regulate its appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, the only provision
that might implicitly give Congress any authority with respect to
the Court confirms that the Constitution, not Congress, vests the
judicial power in the highest tribunal. This provision is the Necessary and Proper Clause, which authorizes the national legislature to make laws "for carrying into Execution [its own enumerated powers], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."24 The only laws Congress may pass with respect
to the Court pursuant to this authorization are those that carry
' It has the same structure as Section 1 of the Twenty-First Amendment, which provides "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
hereby repealed." This is also the structure of the Preamble.
' US Conast, Art I, § 8, cl 18.
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into execution powers already vested in the Court by the Constitution. Although Congress does indeed pass such laws, for example, when it establishes the office of Clerk and provides a building, it is hard to see how a law purporting to give the Court the
judicial power in the first place could be said to carry into execution any power the institution already had.
Despite Justice Story's histrionics,' the suggestion that Article III begins with a command to Congress to vest the judicial
power cannot be sustained. The rules laid down by the Vesting
Clause are mandatory, to be sure, in that the legislature has no
power to change them. The clause does not, however, order Congress to do the vesting. The Constitution does that itself.26
B. The Extending Clause
Here the issue is really joined. Orthodoxy maintains that the
first paragraph of Section 2 sets out the maximum scope of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts without determining the extent
to which any federal court shall actually have any or all of that
jurisdiction. A traditionalist paraphrase of the clause, then,
would begin, "The judicial power may be used to decide . . ." or

"The judicial power shall be capable of deciding... ." Mandatory
theory, by contrast, maintains that the clause sets out both the
maximum and minimum jurisdiction of the federal courts.27 It is,
as we shall see, more difficult to come up with a good paraphrase
of the mandatory reading.
Article III, which charters the judiciary of a government of
enumerated powers, must address two issues. First, it must determine the maximum scope of federal jurisdiction. This is a fundamental matter, as the principle of enumerated powers pervades the document. It appears in the first sentence of Article I,
which vests in Congress all the legislative powers "herein
granted," and is made explicit in the capstone of the framing settlement, what is now the Tenth Amendment. As a consequence,
one of the basic questions that the structural provisions of the
See note 12.
Steven Calabresi has pointed out that the Vesting Clause of Article III is the provision of the Constitution that authorizes the federal courts to exercise power. See Steven
G. Calabresi, The Vesting ClausesAs Power Grants, 88 Nw U L Rev 1377, 1380-89 (1994).
According to Clinton, the maximum and minimum coincide, so the clause lists the
categories of cases that must be within the jurisdiction of some federal court. See Clinton,
132 U Pa L Rev at 753 (cited in note 10). According to Amar, they coincide for the casedenominated heads of jurisdiction but not for the others, so the former prescribe the categories of cases that must be within the jurisdiction of some federal court while the latter
demand that at least two controversies from each category be finally determinable by a
court of the United States. See Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 240 & n 119 (cited in note 14).
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Constitution must answer concerns the maximum reach of federal authority, the most that might be done by the new government. That question is conceptually separate from the question
of the extent to which that authority actually will be exercised.
To say what kinds of laws may be passed is not to say whether
they will be passed; to grant a power is not to determine how far
it will be used.
The Constitution, therefore, also must deal with the question
of the extent to which federal judicial authority actually will be
exercised. It need not, to be sure, resolve that question. Instead,
the decision can be left for Congress, as many important choices
are. In fact, orthodox and mandatory theorists agree that the
Constitution itself partly determines the actual jurisdiction of
the federal courts while leaving some discretion to Congress. According to the orthodox reading, the Constitution fixes the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and sets a default for the
Court's appellate jurisdiction while giving Congress power to
make exceptions; inferior court jurisdiction is for Congress to set,
up to the constitutional maximum. Clinton, by contrast, argues
that the Constitution fixes the set of cases and controversies that
must be open to decision by a federal court while leaving to Congress some discretion to allocate cases between the Supreme
Court and whatever inferior courts Congress chooses to create.2 8
Orthodoxy maintains that the Extending Clause resolves the
first issue and does only that. In setting out the extent of the federal judicial power, according to this reading, the Constitution
sets the maximum potential reach of the federal courts' power to
decide cases and controversies. Their actual jurisdiction is dealt
with in the provisions that refer to particular courts. Those provisions are the second paragraph of Article III, Section 2, which
deals with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and the passages in
Articles I and III that authorize Congress to constitute inferior
tribunals.29
It is sensible to read the Extending Clause as setting out the
maximum potential scope of federal jurisdiction for two reasons.
First, as a general matter, a reference to the extent of a governmental power is a natural way to set out the power's maximum
potential use. This point appears if we consider what it means in

' Amar combines the two theories, suggesting Clinton's result is correct for the case-

denominated heads of jurisdiction while the orthodox reading is proper for the controversy-denominated heads, subject to the proviso that "some" of each of the enumerated
controversies must be eligible for federal decision. See Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 240-46
(cited in note 14).
See US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 9; Art III, § 1.
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other constitutional contexts to speak of the extent of a power. To
describe the extent of Congress's power, for example, is to describe the ways in which the power might be exercised. It is to
speak of a potential, and not of the power's actual use. This locution is not novel. In Ogden v Saunders, Justice Washington referred to the areas in which Congress had been given power as
"every other subject to which the power of Congress had been
previously extended." ° The power of Congress extends to passing
a law that would make the erg the country's official unit of
measure for energy. 3' As far as I can tell, however, that power
has never been exercised.2 Congressional power extends to the
passage of many laws that have not been and probably never will
be enacted. To describe the extent of legislative power is to describe the laws that may be passed, to describe the potential applications of that power. Moreover, to prescribe the full extent of
a power is to set out its maximum potential reach. Describing the
legislative power's extent, however, is not to say which of the
permissible laws shall be passed. A description of extent leaves
that question for another day.
It is easy to see the parallel formulation with respect to the
judicial power. Under an analogous reading, a provision setting
out the extent of the judicial power would set out the most that
might be done with the power without deciding whether it would
be done. Before any case actually could be decided, someone
would have to take a second step. An examination of Article III
shows that the second step concerning jurisdiction is partly taken
by the Constitution itself and partly left to Congress: the Constitution sets out rules concerning the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, while giving Congress some power to alter that jurisdiction and full power over the jurisdiction of the inferior courts,
within the limits to which the judicial power extends.
Second, Article IIrs shift in Section 2 from the judicial power
(its vesting and its extent) to the jurisdiction of a specific tribunal is a natural way of expressing separate answers to the separate questions of the maximum scope of the lawsuits federal
courts may be able to decide and the actual rules that determine
the lawsuits they will be able to decide at any time. Judicial
power and jurisdiction are obviously closely related concepts, but,
just as obviously, they are not the same concept. According to the
Constitution's usage, the Supreme Court and the inferior federal
25 US (12 Wheat) 213, 275 (1827).
See US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 5 (weights and measures).
"The official units of measure for energy are the joule and the kilowatt-hour. 15 USC
§ 223 (1994).
30
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courts have the same judicial power-they are vested with the
judicial power of the United States-even though they have different jurisdictions.3 The judicial power is thus less specific than
a particular court's jurisdiction, as the potential is less specific
than the actual.
The orthodox interpretation, then, accounts for Article III's
two-stage formulation. It also raises the question of why, given
that the working business of government requires provision for
the jurisdiction of actual courts, the framers proceeded in two
stages. Article III's formulation is not the only way to put the
point, and it may seem needlessly complex. Why not talk about
jurisdiction throughout? The answer is that the two-stage process, moving from judicial power to jurisdiction, is a relatively
clear and elegant way of accommodating the compromise that
put off the question of whether to have inferior federal courts.
This point comes into sharp focus if we compare the two-stage
approach with the alternative way of accomplishing the same result, which would drop the stage dealing with the judicial power
in the abstract and address only the jurisdiction of courts.
It is especially easy to make this comparison because the
drafting process of Article III provides the contrast. The judiciary
article reported by the Committee of Detail did not use the intermediate stage about the judicial power.34 The problem with
' State constitutions from the time of the framing and shortly thereafter also use this
phrasing, whereby courts with differing jurisdictions are all vested with the same judicial
power. Examples include the Delaware Constitution of 1792, Art VI, § 1 (judicial power of
the State vested in a court of chancery, a supreme court, courts of oyer and terminer and
general gaol-delivery, a court of common pleas, and various others); the Georgia Constitution of 1798, Art III, § 1 (judicial power vested in superior court and such inferior courts
as the legislature shall establish; jurisdiction of superior court then set out); the Kentucky Constitution of 1792, Art V, §§ 1, 3 (judicial power vested in one supreme court and
such inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; jurisdiction of supreme
court set out); and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, Art V, § 1 (judicial power
vested in listed courts, including such others as the legislature may establish).
' After a vesting clause and a tenure clause, the Committee's report provided as follows:

The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws
passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of Officers of the
United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies
between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction)
between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original.
In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions
and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President of
the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think
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that approach is that the appearance of the inferior courts comes
as a surprise. All along the reader has been led to believe that
the provision deals with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
that is natural enough, because only the Supreme Court is certain to exist. Then it turns out the provision has also been setting
out the potential jurisdiction of the inferior courts, should there
be any. Article III, by contrast, associates the jurisdictional heads
with the more abstract judicial power of the United States, which
it has just told us is vested in the supreme and inferior courts.
Thus the reader knows all along that the list applies to the federal courts generally, with it understood that it is up to Congress
whether there will be any inferior courts. Moreover, the approach
the Convention finally adopted (and that the Committee of Style
polished) is more elegant because it dispenses with the need to
mention the inferior courts. We know all that we need to know
from the Extending Clause and from Congress's power to constitute those tribunals. Thus does the orthodox reading explain the
move from judicial power to jurisdiction.
Clinton's mandatory theory, by contrast, is hard pressed to
explain the language of Article III. He maintains that the Extending Clause, in addition to whatever else it does, deals with
the actual jurisdiction of the federal courts by setting a floor on
their collective authority: some federal court must be able to decide all the enumerated cases and controversies. This reading encounters severe difficulties. It tries to combine multiple functions
in a single clause in a way that is at best cumbersome and, worse
yet, very difficult to squeeze out of the text.
One problem is gross inelegance. Mandatory theorists and
traditionalists agree that if Congress were simply to set the
number of Supreme Court judges and not use its exceptions
power, all would be right with the world: the Court would have
jurisdiction over all cases and controversies eligible for federal
resolution. Under such circumstances, one would not need to
know whether there is a floor on federal jurisdiction. That question can arise only if Congress exercises its power to except from
the Court's appellate jurisdiction. It is then that the floor-setting
function of Clinton's Extending Clause kicks in: if Congress excepts any cases from the appellate jurisdiction, it must create

proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.
Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 186-87 (Yale rev ed
1966). On August 27 the Convention replaced "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court"
with "the Judicial power," and deleted the sentence beginning "The Legislature may assign." Both votes were unanimous. Id at 431.
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federal jurisdiction over those cases elsewhere, by an exercise of
its power to constitute inferior tribunals.
Clinton's Extending Clause, although it does not say so, is
thus a condition on the exceptions power, one that requires an
exercise of the inferior-tribunals power. The rest of the Constitution is not drafted in this indirect and allusive manner; it is
drafted more sensibly. Limitations on congressional power are
phrased as such. A limitation on a specific power is usually attached to the power itself. duties, imposts, and excises, like laws
on bankruptcy and naturalization, must be uniform; the power to
raise and support armies has joined to it the proviso that no appropriation for an army be for more than two years." Similarly,
affirmative duties, which are rare, are phrased as such. The census is required to be taken and the President is enjoined to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. 6
Even if we are prepared to believe that the Extending Clause
plays hide-and-seek, it is not clear how Clinton thinks it does so.
How would we paraphrase the clause so that it does what his
theory needs it to do? Clinton's suggestion seems to be this: it
means, "The jurisdiction of some federal court must extend to
. . . ."The fact that the Constitution nowhere uses the word
"must" suggests that something strange is afoot, as indeed it is.
A translation of "shall" as "must" appeals to Clinton because it
sets a floor. If some federal court must be able to decide a case,
surely some federal court may be able to do so. But what about
the ceiling? As explained above, to set the extent of a power is to
set limits on that power. But to say what cases jurisdiction must
reach implies no such limits. If the Extending Clause sets no
ceiling, the sky is the limit. Congress has explicit power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, tribunals possessing the judicial power of the United States. In establishing an inferior tribunal, it is necessary and proper to give it jurisdictionsay, jurisdiction over all cases between citizens of the same
State.3 7 So much for enumerated judicial power.

US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 1 (granting power to "lay Duties, Imposts, and Excises," but
requiring that they be uniform); id, cl4 (granting power to "establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States"); id, cl 12 (granting power to "raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years").
US Const, Art I, § 2, cl3 (census "shall be made"); id, Art II, § 3 (President "shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
"If leaving these inferior courts without appellate supervision sounds like creating
multiple supreme courts, never fear. Giving the real Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over these cases would be a proper way to ensure that the inferior courts perform their
function well.
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If "must" does not work, we can go back to "shall." Clinton's
key move is to equate the judicial power of the United States
with the jurisdiction of the federal courts, so that jurisdiction
may simply be substituted in sentences referring to judicial
power. I suggest above that this is an odd move, because the
phrases are different "andcan readily be seen to name two closely
related, but nevertheless distinct, items of constitutional furniture: the potential and the actual scope of federal jurisdiction.
Suppose nevertheless that the Extending Clause can be translated as, "The jurisdiction of the federal courts is hereby extended to ..... That is the natural paraphrase of the Extending
Clause if Clinton is right that the judicial power is identical with
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 8 Such a provision may provide the necessary ceiling, but now there is a problem with the
floor. 9 The statement that jurisdiction is extended to certain
cases, combined with the later statement that Congress may except from jurisdiction, implies that the Constitution enacts an
initial rule that Congress then may modify.4 ° That is not the
mandatory reading.
Amar proposes a modified form of Clinton's interpretation,
one designed to keep the diversity jurisdiction under control. As
William Casto has pointed out, Amar's all/some reading produces
nonsense when combined with Clinton's mandatory reading.4 '
Clinton maintains that a reference to the extent of the judicial
power authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, sets a ceiling on actual jurisdiction, and sets a floor on actual jurisdiction: "The judicial power shall extend to . . ." means "The jurisdiction of the
federal courts must extend to, and may only extend to ....
"

"On the orthodox reading, because the phrases are not interchangeable, otherwisesimilar statements using them are related but not identical. To say that the judicial
power extends to a case is to say that the jurisdiction of some federal court may do so.
In fact, there are still problems with the ceiling. If the Extending Clause does mean
that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is extended to certain cases and controversies,
the mandatory reading needs an implicit "only" to set the maximum. Otherwise Congress,
through its power to constitute inferior tribunals, once again can add more federal jurisdiction. This is not a problem for the orthodox reading, which takes seriously the fact that
the Extending Clause refers, not to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but to the judicial power. In a constitution of enumerated powers, one in which the "powers not delegated to the United States ... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,"
US Const, Amend X, grants of power are implicitly limiting.
"This is the procedure the Constitution adopts with respect to the date of Congress's
annual meeting. US Const, Amend XX, § 2.
" See William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional
Control Over Federal Jurisdiction,7 Const Comm 89, 90-91 (1990). Casto's discussion of
the two-tier thesis in the context of the mandatory reading accepts the premise that the
absence of "all" implies the presence of "some." I contend below that this inference is unsound.
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Amar maintains that the absence of "all" implies the presence of
"some" before "controversies." If these two paraphrases are put
together, then as to the controversy-denominated heads, the Extending Clause means "The jurisdiction of the federal courts
must extend to, and may extend only to ... some controversies
..
"..,42
Amar's reading focuses on the "must" part, but the mandatory reading has to contain not only "must" but also "may
only." If the mandatory theory is correct, the maximum scope of
federal court jurisdiction as to controversies-the "may only"
part-includes the modifier "some." The jurisdiction of the federal courts may not include, for example, all controversies to
which the United States is a party, because it may include only
some of those controversies. At least two must be left out, whatever that means exactly. This is a very strange place to put the
ceiling.
Casto's critique assumes that [no-all] means "some but not
all," or "only some."43 That seems reasonable enough, given that
the two-tier theory interpolates a word or phrase that takes its
meaning by a contrast with "all," the absence of "all" being the
signal that the word or phrase needs to be interpolated. Perhaps
the two-tier reading can be salvaged if [no-all] means "at least
some." This solution is highly implausible, however. First, if
much is to be read into the absence of "all," the natural reading is
indeed the strongest contrary of "all," which is "some but not all."
Second, by introducing this refinement, two-tier theory now finds
in silence not simply sound but an elaborate fugue: [no-all]
means something quite precise and must not mean anything else.
Finally, it is still not clear that the reading makes any sense.
"The jurisdiction of the federal courts may extend only to at least
some controversies . . ." is so unnatural as to be at most barely
meaningful.
All this trouble with the two-tier reading arises because that
interpretation really needs two Extending Clauses for the controversy-denominated tier. One clause would authorize jurisdiction and set out its maximum scope. That Extending Clause rejects both Clinton's reading and Amar's: it would use "The judicial power shall extend to. . ." to mean, "The judicial power may
be used to decide, and only to decide . . . ," which is the orthodox
reading, and would assume that "Controversies" refers to every
one of the lawsuits described, not just some or at least some of
" This discussion of Amar assumes what I think is false, that the Extending Clause
somehow can generate both the maximum and the minimum rules Clinton attributes to
it.
, See Casto, 7 Const Comm at 91 (cited in note 41).
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them. The other Extending Clause would establish the floor for
federal jurisdiction. It would embrace Clinton's understanding of
"The judicial power shall extend to.. ." and Amar's understanding of the absence of "all." But there is only one Extending
Clause.
On the orthodox reading the Extending Clause is natural,
indeed elegant. On either mandatory reading it is obscure at
best, more likely unintelligible.
C. The Change From "All Cases" to "Controversies": Two Tiers
of Jurisdiction
Neither Amar nor Clinton, then, can explain how the language of the Extending Clause does what they think it does.
Amar, however, is correct in puzzling over the fact that in the
midst of laying out the lawsuits to which the federal judicial
power extends, the clause switches terminology. The power extends to all cases arising under federal law, to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and to all cases
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. It further extends to controversies-not all cases, not cases, not all controversies-to
which the United States shall be a party, and so forth. Perhaps
Article III is trying to mystify us-why the change from all cases
to controversies? Amar suggests that this change signals a switch
from lawsuits that must be heard in some federal court to those
that may be if Congress so decides.
The language of the Extending Clause does indeed demarcate two tiers of federal judicial power, but the difference is not
between required and permitted jurisdiction. Rather, it is about
the scope of the different jurisdictional heads. "All cases" includes both civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions by American
governments, state and federal. The word "all" emphasizes that
"ccases" is a general term encompassing both civil and criminal
proceedings. It also indicates that the Constitution sometimes
authorizes federal courts to entertain criminal prosecutions under state law. The Constitution thus partially rejects the principle that the courts of one sovereign will not enforce the criminal
laws of another, if one sees the state and federal governments as
different sovereignties. It would probably be more accurate to say
that the Constitution structures the state and federal governments so that in them sovereignty is partially divided and partially integrated. The result of this unique arrangement is that
state and federal courts are not foreign to one another for all
purposes. "Controversies," however, includes only civil proceedings; the heads of jurisdiction so denominated include some in
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which it would be inappropriate to entertain state criminal
prosecutions in federal court.
In this section I will first develop the two-tiered view just
described. I will then discuss the textual objections to Amar's explanation of the shift from "all cases" to "controversies."
1. "All" cases: civil and criminal, federal and state.
a) Cases and controversies, civil and criminal proceedings.
Recent scholarship has noted that two respectable authorities
from the early days of the Constitution addressed the terminology used in Article III." Justice James Iredell, one of President
Washington's first appointees to the Supreme Court, and St.
George Tucker, a Virginia judge and annotator of Blackstone,
both asserted that the term "controversies" includes only civil
proceedings." I have two points to add. First, there is additional
evidence that confirms what Iredell and Tucker said, although it
does not conclude the point. Second, I wish to emphasize the connection between the limited scope of "controversies" and the
principle, familiar then and now, that the courts of one sovereign
will not enforce the penal laws of another.
The development of the use of "controversy" to refer specifically to civil proceedings remains somewhat hazy. English legal
dictionaries available in America in the late eighteenth century
that I have found do not have a separate definition for

" See William A. Fletcher, Letter to the Editor, in Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U Chi L Rev 131, 133 (1990); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
OriginalJurisdictionin State-Party Cases, 82 Cal L Rev 555, 604-09 (1994).
' Dissenting in Chisholm v Georgia,2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793), Justice Iredell said this
about the state-party jurisdiction over controversies:
The constitution is particular in expressing the parties who may be the objects of
the jurisdiction in any of these cases, but in respect to the subject-matter upon which
such jurisdiction is to be exercised, used the word "controversies" only. The act of
Congress [the Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, ch 20, 1 Stat 73, 80] more particularly mentions civil controversies, a qualification of the general word in the constitution,
which I do not doubt every reasonable man will think well warranted, for it cannot
be presumed, that the general word "controversies" was intended to include any proceedings that relate to criminal cases, which in all instances that respect the same
government only, are uniformly considered of a local nature; and to be decided by its
particular laws. The word "controversy" indeed, would not naturally justify any such
construction, but nevertheless it was perhaps a proper instance of caution in congress to guard against the possibility of it.
Id at 430-31. Judge Tucker glossed the first appearance in Article III of "controversies"
thus: "The word controversies, as here used, must be understood merely as relating to
such as are of a civil nature. It is probably unknown in any other sense, as I do not recollect ever to have heard the expression, criminal controversy." St. George Tucker, ed, 1
Blackstone's Commentaries App at 420 (Birch and Small 1803).
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"controversy."46 American legal dictionaries in the nineteenth
century, however, regularly define "controversy" as a civil case.47
Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, cited Tucker's

and Iredell's construction of the term without either endorsing or
rejecting their reading."
It is not possible at this point to say with confidence what
happened, or to assess fully the extent to which Iredell and
Tucker were correct. Perhaps they first articulated an Americanism that was in the process of becoming a term of art, one
that eventually made its way into dictionaries. Or they may have
been more involved in the causal process than that; perhaps the
term took on the limited meaning, and began to appear under
that usage in dictionaries, because these two important authorities said it had that meaning. Most of the evidence so far, however, supports the conclusion that Iredell and Tucker helped a
meaning crystallize, rather than drawing one out of thin air.
There is reason to believe that at the time of the framing, the

" See Thomas Blount, A Law-Dictionary and Glossary (Eliz, Nutt & Gosling 3d ed
1717); John Cowel, A Law Dictionary(Nutt & Gosling 2d ed 1727); Timothy Cunningham,
1 A New and Complete Law-Dictionary (Law-Printers to the King 1764); Giles Jacob, A
New Law-Dictionary (Lintot 5th ed 1744). For bibliographies of legal works from this period, including law dictionaries, see William H. Bryson, Census of Law Books in Colonial
Virginia (Virginia 1978); Herbert A. Johnson, Imported Eighteenth-CenturyLaw Treatises
In American Libraries,1700-1799 (Tennessee 1978).
" The earliest American dictionary I have been able to consult is the first edition of
Bouvier's, from 1839; it does not contain a separate definition of "controversy." John Bouvier, 1 Law Dictionary (1st ed 1839). By the third edition in 1848, however, Bouvier defined a controversy as "a dispute arising between two or more persons; it differs from
case, which includes all suits criminal as well as civil; whereas controversy is a civil and
not a criminal proceeding." John Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary337 (Johnson 3d ed 1848).
Bouvier cited Iredell, Tucker, and Story. Id. The distinction was still around in 1883. See
Stewart Rapaje and Robert L. Lawrence, 1 A Dictionary of American and English Law
286 (Linn 1883) (defining controversy as a "dispute between two or more persons; a civil
action or suit, either at law or in equity"). The suggestion that there were variant usages,
however, can be found in an 1889 dictionary, which in large type defines "controversy" as
"[amny issue, whether of a civil or criminal nature; a case," and then in small type says,
"[a] civil proceeding-, as, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend 'to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.'" William C. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 252 (Flood 1889). Anderson's entry on "Cases and controversies" cites Justice
Field for the proposition that 'controversies,' if distinguishable from 'cases,' is so in that
it is less comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature." Id at
153, citing In re PacificRailway Commission, 32 F 241, 255 (1887). The first edition of
Black's Law Dictionary, in 1891, says that "controversy" differs from 'case,' which includes all suits, criminal as well as civil; whereas 'controversy' is a civil and not a criminal proceeding," and cites Iredell. Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary271 (lst
ed 1891). In 1893, Kinney's A Law Dictionaryand Glossary defined "controversy" as "[a]
dispute; a civil action or proceeding." J. Kendrick Kinney, Law Dictionary and Glossary
197 (Callaghan 1893).
'Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1674 at
445 n 1 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1851).
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word "controversy," in a legal context, connoted a disagreement
between jural equals, and in particular a dispute over private
rights. The word "case," by contrast, seems to have applied more
generally to include situations in which the courts, rather than
arbitrating disputes, acted as organs for the application of public
power. A criminal prosecution is the central example of the latter
type of proceeding.
Some writings from the ratification debates strongly suggest
that their authors equated controversies with civil proceedings.
The New York anti-federalist who wrote as Brutus, for example,
summarized Article III in these words: "The powers of [the proposed federal] courts are very extensive; their jurisdiction comprehends all civil causes, except such as arise between citizens of
the same state; and it extends to all cases in law and equity
arising under the constitution."49 Brutus's reference to the heads
of jurisdiction that comprehend nearly all civil causes is almost
certainly an epitome of the controversy-denominated heads.
Two other passages include revealing usages of "cases" and
"controversies." During the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
Robert Whitehill, an anti-federalist, offered a set of amendments.
One would have limited the judicial power
to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to
controversies between two or more states-between citizens
claiming lands under grants of different states, and between
a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, and in
criminal cases, to such only as are expressly enumerated in
the Constitution. °
After referring several times to "controversies," when Whitehill
wanted to speak of criminal proceedings he switched back to
"cases." This shift suggests the words had contrasting meanings
and that only "cases" included criminal proceedings.
Similarly, "A Native of Virginia" said this to defend the Constitution against the common charge that it eliminated civil jury
trial:
' Brutus 1, in John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 13 The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 411, 415 (State Hist Socy Wis 1981).
"Brutus" probably was New York judge Robert Yates. See G. Edward White, Recovering
Coterminous Power Theory: The Lost Dimension of Marshall Court Sovereignty Cases, in
Maeva Marcus, ed, Origins of the Federal Judiciary:Essays on the JudiciaryAct of 1789
66, 103 n 33 (Oxford 1992).
Merrill Jensen, ed, 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 598-99 (Worzalla 1976).

224

The University of Chicago Law Review

[64:203

In criminal cases, the trial by jury is most important. In
criminal cases the Constitution has established it unequivocally. But in having only recognized this trial in criminal, it
by no means follows that it takes it away in civil cases: And
we may fairly presume, that by the law which the Congress
will make to compleat the system of the Federal Court, it
will be introduced, as far as it shall be found practicable,
and applicable to such controversies as from their nature are
subjects proper to be determined in that Court."
The Virginian's usage strongly suggests he equated controversies
with civil cases.
Another important indicator that Iredell and Tucker were
correct about the legal connotation of "controversies" is the fact
that it was often used interchangeably with "disputes." The Federal Convention, drafting what became Article III, switched from
"disputes" to "controversies" as if they were synonyms.52 At the
Virginia ratifying convention a number of speakers did likewise.
George Mason, for example, presented a detailed critique of the
controversy-denominated heads in which he used one word and
then the other, as if he were engaging in purely stylistic variation.5 3 Similar usage is found in speeches of Edmund Pendleton
and Edmund Randolph.5 4 To speak of a dispute connotes a con" Observations upon the ProposedPlan of Federal Government, in John P. Kaminski
and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 9 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 655, 686 (State Hist Socy Wis 1990).
2 Draft judiciary provisions used by the Committee of Detail, largely in the hand of
Edmund Randolph, extended the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal to "disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another State," to "disputes between different
states," and to "disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are concerned."
Farrand, 2 Records at 147 (cited in note 34). The next Committee of Detail draft that
deals with this matter is much like Article III and uses "controversies" instead of
"disputes." Id at 173.
' See John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 10 The Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution 1403 (State Hist Socy Wis 1993).
Id at 1427 (Pendleton) (discussing disputes); id at 1451 (Randolph) (referring to
both "disputes" and "controversies' between states). Madison referred to the federal
courts' "cognizance of disputes between citizens of different States." Id at 1414. The Virginia ratifying convention's proposed amendments to Article III likewise used "disputes"
as a synonym for "controversies," id at 1555, as did the Pennsylvanian called "One of the
People," Letter, To the Freemen of Pennsylvania,in Jensen, ed, 2 Documentary History at
186, 191 (cited in note 50).
Examples can be multiplied. Thomas Sergeant, for instance, began a paragraph about
colonial jurisdiction by stating, "Controversies between two of the provinces concerning
the extent of their charter boundaries or the like, came before the King in his privy council,"
Thomas Sergeant, A Brief Sketch of the National Judiciary Powers Exercised in the
United States, in Peter S. DuPonceau, A Dissertationon the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States 135, 140 (Arno 1972) (reprinting 1824 ed),
and continued, "Thus in July 1764, the King in privy council approved the report of a
committee of council for plantation affairs, relative to the disputes that had for some
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test between equals, like two claimants to the same property.5 It
does not fit well with a criminal proceeding, in which the power
of the government is brought to bear against an individual
through the courts. 6
Speeches by the two Edmunds of Virginia (Pendleton and
Randolph) provide further support for the claim that controversies means civil cases. During the ratifying convention, each of
them referred to "criminal cases" and "civil cases" in close proximity, but neither ever spoke about "criminal controversies."5 7
Indeed, that latter phrase does not appear in the records of the
Virginia convention's debate on Article III."s Correlative support
for the claim that controversies were distinctively civil comes
from an amendment considered in Pennsylvania and actually
proposed by the Virginia convention that dealt with the vexed issue of jury trials in noncriminal proceedings. The amendment
would have secured the jury trial in "controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man."59
Next, if controversies include criminal actions, then under
Article Ill a State could prosecute a citizen of another State in
the federal courts, perhaps in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Some determined opponents of the Constitution, including Patrick Henry himself, denounced the state-party jurisdiction
without mentioning this awful possibility, which suggests it had
not occurred to them."0 At least two anti-federalists did raise this
years subsisted between the provinces of New Hampshire and New York," id at 140-41.
Bouvier defined a "dispute" as a "conversation between two persons who are of a
different opinion in relation to a particular matter; a contest as to some right." Bouvier,
Law Dictionary at 470 (3d ed) (cited in note 47).
On this point I agree with Pushaw. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article IIrs
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame
L Rev 447, 464 (1994).
,' Kaminski and Saladino, eds, 10 Documentary History at 1425 (cited in note 53) (A
reader of the Constitution would find that jury trial is not excluded "in civil cases, and
that it was expressly provided for in criminal cases.") (Pendleton); id at 1453 (Jury trial
"is not excluded in civil cases, nor is a jury from the vicinage in criminal cases excluded.")
(Randolph).
' Moreover, a LEXIS search conducted on October 14, 1996, in the US Supreme
Court file for references to "criminal controversy" or "criminal controversies" produced no
cases.
" For the Pennsylvania version, see Jensen, ed, 2 Documentary History at 597 (cited
in note 50); the Virginia version is at Kaminski and Saladino, eds, 10 Documentary History at 1552 (cited in note 53).
3 See Speech of Henry to Virginia ratifying convention, in Kaminski and Saladino,
eds, 10 Documentary History at 1423 (cited in note 53); Brutus 13, in John P. Kaminski
and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 16 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 172-75 (State Hist Socy Wis 1986). This group also included the formidable, not
to mention voluble, Luther Martin. Luther Martin, The Genuine InformationDelivered to
the Legislature of the State of Maryland, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete AntiFederalist27, 69-70 (Chicago 1981).
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specter and what they said is revealing. Centinel, addressing
Pennsylvania, wrote:
This jurisdiction also goes to controversies between any
state and its citizens; which, though probably not intended,
may hereafter be set up as a ground to divest the states,
severally, of the trial of criminals; inasmuch as every charge
of felony or misdemeanour, is a controversy between the
state and a citizen of the same: that is to say, the state is
plaintiff and the party accused is defendant in the prosecution.6 1
Centinel had to distort Article III in two ways to reach his conclusion: the federal judicial power does not extend to cases between a State and its own citizens, and, as he recognized, the
controversy-denominated jurisdiction was not intended to reach
criminal proceedings. Moreover, in order to make criminal prosecutions sound like controversies, Centinel had to describe prosecutions so as to make them seem as much as possible like civil
suits, even calling the government the "plaintiff," as if it were
one more private disputant.
Agrippa, writing in Massachusetts, asserted that federal jurisdiction over state-citizen controversies would include criminal
prosecutions:
This [ ] right to try causes between a state and citizens of
another state, involves in it all criminal causes; and a man
who has accidentally transgressed the laws of another state,
must be transported, with all his witnesses, to a third state,
to be tried. He must be ruined to prove his innocence.62
The Constitution, however, does not give the federal courts the
right to try causes between a state and citizens of another state;
it gives them the right to try controversies. It is possible Agrippa
thought the two equivalent and just happened to paraphrase the
Constitution rather than quoting it. It is also possible that he
had a nagging awareness that "criminal controversies" would
have seemed unnatural.

Centinel 2, in Storing, ed, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist143, 148 (cited in note 60).
"Agrippa 12, in Storing, ed, 4 Complete Anti-Federalist93, 97 (cited in note 60). Agrippa may have made a similar assertion in his letter of January 1, 1788, where he said
that "By article 3, section 2, Congress are empowered to appoint courts with authority to
try civil causes of every kind, and even offences against particular states." Agrippa 10, in
Storing, ed, 4 Complete Anti-Federalist87, 88 (cited in note 60). It is not clear whether he
attributed the latter conclusion to the case-denominated or controversy-denominated
heads.
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Centinel and Agrippa opposed ratification and were clearly
reaching for anything they could find; what is interesting is that
they did not just bluntly assert that controversies include prosecutions, but rather finessed the constitutional text to get to their
substantive conclusions. Opponents of the thesis that controversies were limited to civil proceedings can draw some support
from statements by two major figures, although the support they
offer is not great. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
James Wilson said, "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in
law and equity arising under this Constitution and the laws of
the United States. Controversies may certainly arise under this
Constitution and the laws of the United States, and is it not
proper that there should be judges to decide them?" 3 Wilson's
words suggest he thought cases and controversies interchangeable. His statement, though, is consistent with the proposition
that controversies are a kind of case, and it may well have been
that he had civil lawsuits in mind, especially in a day when
"controversies" was widely interchangeable with "disputes."
Another Wilsonism that cuts against the civil controversies
thesis appears in his Lectures on Law, where he said that the old
English aula regis "was always in readiness to determine every
controversy, criminal and civil."" Later in the lectures, though,
discussing jurisdiction under the American Constitution, Wilson
used "controversies" in a sense that almost certainly referred
only to civil proceedings. As part of his attack on sovereign immunity, he said, "In controversies, to which the state or nation is
a party, the state or nation itself ought to be amenable before the
judicial powers." 5 In criminal proceedings the state must appear
before the judiciary, but never as the defendant; the question
Wilson was addressing was whether a government may or should
appear as a defendant in a civil proceeding. Moreover, the difference between these contexts-one about the aula regis, the other
about the Constitution-is suggestive. On the current evidence
there is no reason to believe that in British English "controversy"
had a meaning limited to civil proceedings; as far as we know
that was strictly an Americanism.6 6 Hence there are two possible
explanations for Wilson's reference to criminal controversies.
First, he may have been using English terminology to refer to
English practice. Second, he may have been using English termiSpeech of Wilson, in Jensen, ed, 2 DocumentaryHistory at 517 (cited in note 50).
James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in Robert Green McCloskey, ed, 2 The Works of
James Wilson 451 (Harvard 1967).
Id at 497.
See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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nology because, having been born and received his early education in Scotland, he had not fully adopted American legal idioms.

67

The other source of equivocal support for equating cases and
controversies is the natural-born genius of American constitutional law, John Marshall. Praising Article III in the Virginia
ratifying convention, Marshall said, "Here are tribunals appointed for the decision of controversies which were before, either
not at all, or improperly provided for."68 Marshall may have been
using "controversies" as a general term that included civil and
criminal proceedings, or he may have been referring to the controversy-denominated heads of jurisdiction. Perhaps most likely,
he may not have been paying perfect attention to detail. This is,
after all, the man who would make a tasty meal of some of his
own off-hand remarks in Marbury years later in Cohens v Virginia.6 9

On balance, additional research supports Iredell and Tucker.
The second point I wish to emphasize is the connection between
the use of "controversies" and the general assumption that sovereigns do not enforce one another's criminal laws. Iredell accounted for the use of a word that was limited to civil proceedings by invoking that standard notion." That principle seems to
have been in circulation when the Constitution was adopted. 7'
Moreover, despite Wilson's wide learning (some might call it pedantry), his use of
these terms was sometimes imprecise. Describing the Judiciary Act of 1789 in his Lectures on Law, he said, "The district courts have, in the first instance, exclusive cognizance
of all causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Wilson, Lectures, in McCloskey, ed,
2 Works of James Wilson at 457 (cited in note 64). What they actually had was "exclusive
original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Judiciary
Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77. Their jurisdiction over criminal admiralty cases, such as
crimes committed on the high seas, was limited, and what they had was shared with the
circuit courts. Id at §§ 9, 11.
"Kaminski and Saladino, eds, 10 Documentary History at 1430 (cited in note 53).
19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 399-402 (1821) ("general expressions" in Marbury were dicta).
Whatever Marshall thought about the difference between cases and controversies, he
thought the following about Congress's power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:
The Honorable Gentleman [apparently Patrick Henry] says, that no law of Congress
can make any exception to the Federal appellate jurisdiction of fact as well as law.
He has frequently spoken of technical terms, and the meaning of them. What is the
meaning of the term exception? Does it not mean an alteration and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and
fact, of the Supreme Court.-These exceptions certainly go as far as the Legislature
may think proper, for the interest and liberty of the people.
Speech of John Marshall to Virginia ratifying convention, in Kaminski and Saladino, eds,
10 Documentary History at 1437 (cited in note 53).
7' See Chisholm, 2 US at 431-32.
See, for example, Warder v Arell, 2 Va (2 Wash) 282, 295 (1796) (Roane); The Ante-
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That is not to say that Americans at the time of the framing
thought there was some sort of logical contradiction or gross political error in allowing federal courts to hear state criminal
prosecutions, or vice versa. At the Federal Convention itself, the
New Jersey plan, presented to the Convention by William Paterson, provided for the trial of certain offenses against the national
laws in state court, with appeal to federal court.7 2 And as we will
see presently, there is reason to believe that the Convention, although it did not adopt the New Jersey plan, did authorize the
courts of one level of government to entertain criminal prosecutions under the laws of the other.73 As applied to the new government of America, then, the penal law maxim was a baseline
or default option, not an absolute rule. Nevertheless, the fact
that several heads of jurisdiction are confined to controversies
likely reflects the influence of the maxim.
Orthodoxy's distinction between cases and controversies is
not, of course, unchallenged. Unlike Amar, who sometimes
equates these terms, Robert Pushaw acknowledges that at the
time of the framing there was a distinction between cases and
controversies. He argues, however, that it was not, or was not
primarily, the distinction between a general term for lawsuits
and one that applied only to civil proceedings. Rather, according
to Pushaw, the difference was that in a case the court's main
function was the exposition of the law, whereas in a controversy
its main function was resolution of the particular dispute before
it.74 Although he casts doubt on the theory that controversies are
limited to civil cases, he believes that it "complements, rather
than contradicts" his thesis. 5
The most severe difficulty with this theory is that it has no
Iredell and no Tucker. Pushaw's evidence for framing-era usage
is based on statements seemingly driven by or consistent with his

lope, 23 US (10 Wheat) 66, 123 (1825); William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America 200 (Nicklin 2d ed 1829); Joseph Story, Commentaries On the
Conflict of Laws §§ 619-21 at 1013-15 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1846).
Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 243 (cited in note 34).
The convention's plan might be characterized as a departure from the maxim, but I
think it more accurate and more telling to say that the Convention revised the notion of
sovereignty to suit itself. See text accompanying notes 107-15.
",Pushaw, 69 Notre Dame L Rev at 449-50 (cited in note 56). Pushaw's primary concern is to criticize the jurisdictional doctrines that keep the federal courts from providing
advisory opinions and deciding questions of public right at the behest of private persons.
He suggests the Court has improperly applied the dispute-resolution model appropriate
to controversies to what should be the broader realm of cases. See id at 519. Why it would
make sense to authorize advisory opinions in admiralty cases, but not when two States of
the Union have a legal disagreement is unclear.
' Id at 460-64.
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distinction; no one comes out and says what he thinks they
meant. Pushaw thus lacks direct evidence for his claim. Second,
the law-expounding theory of cases fits best with the federal
question jurisdiction (with which moderns are obsessed) but
poorly with foreign officer jurisdiction." Especially with respect
to consuls, foreign officer cases mainly would be ordinary civil
litigation. Their distinctive feature would be the privileges of foreign personnel, a question of the law of nations on which the exposition of some American court would be of little interest to the
principal law-makers, the Powers of Europe. The foreign officer
jurisdiction exists to ensure the applicable law will be applied
impartially by judges who have the national interest in mind. It
is a dispute-resolving, not a law-expounding, head of jurisdiction.
Third, if the system was set up with a focus on judicial exposition of the law, it was designed badly. America was not England; it had primitive facilities for the recording and transmission of judicial opinions. 7 Neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the delivery of written opinions, let
alone their public distribution. Indeed, although it is now conventional to label the first volume of Dallas'sReports as the first
of the United States Reports, it might be more accurate to give
the latter number to 14 US, the initial volume prepared by Henry
Wheaton, the Supreme Court's first official reporter. Before the
Wheaton era, year after year and case after case went by in
which Congress left an important constitutional function to unofficial reporters who indiscriminately reported opinions in both
cases and controversies.
b) The uses of "all." The textual force of Amar's two-tier theory derives from its ability to explain the appearance and nonappearance of the word "all" in Section 2 of Article 111.78 The foregoing discussion of the meaning of "cases" and "controversies"
makes possible an alternative account, under which Congress
has no obligation to ensure that some federal court hear every
lawsuit that comes within a case-denominated head of jurisdic-

' A corrective to excessive fascination with the federal question jurisdiction is Wythe
Holt, "To Establish Justice.• Politics, the JudiciaryAct of 1789, and the Invention of the
FederalCourts, 1989 Duke L J 1421.
" The chaotic state of reporting and judicial structure generally at the time of the
framing is discussed in fascinating detail in Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the
JudiciaryAct of 1789 27-52 (Oklahoma 1990). See also John H. Langbein, Chancellor
Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 Colum L Rev 547, 571-78 (1993) (American
case reporting system at time of framing was undeveloped and unreliable).
' William Casto has observed that the change from "all cases" to "controversies" may
have been a drafting accident. Casto, 7 Const Comm at 90 (cited in note 41). That hypothesis is sufficient but not necessary to reject the two-tier reading.
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tion. The alternative account comes in a modest and a slightly
more aggressive form. The modest version simply asserts that
"all" is there to emphasize the criminal-civil distinction. The
more aggressive version asserts that, in addition, "all" indicates
that the case-denominated heads of jurisdiction may include
criminal prosecutions under state law. For each of the two readings, I will provide an explanation of how it represents a familiar
way of using the word "all," and an explanation of why it would
make sense for the Constitution to have that meaning. Because
the second reading-according to which "all" signals that state
criminal prosecutions may take place in federal court-is the less
obvious, I will also present evidence that such a reading would
have seemed reasonable at the time of the framing.
i. The criminal-civil distinction: emphasis. Cases include
criminal prosecutions while controversies do not. "All" can clarify
that point. Where the name of a general category appears in
conjunction with the name of a part of that category, "all" can
emphasize that the broader term does indeed have a more general meaning. Consider, for example, the statement "Canines are
four-legged and dogs are easily domesticated." In what sense is
"canines" being used here? Maybe it is just stylistic variation, a
ten-dollar word for "dogs." On the other hand, maybe the writer
is appealing to the more technical sense in which "canines" refers
to the genus canis, one part of which is the species canis familiaris (Fido, for example). A judicious use of "all" can dispel this confusion. "All canines are four-legged and dogs are easily domesticated" more clearly asserts that wolves and jackals too are quadrupeds but that only homo sapiens' best friend is easily domesticated. In the same way "all" in Article III emphasizes that cases
include criminal proceedings although controversies do not.
This is a substantively likely reading of the text: All of the
case-designated heads of jurisdictions-the first tier of the judicial power-can easily involve criminal proceedings. First, each
of the federal-question heads can involve such proceedings.
Criminal prosecutions under federal statutes need a home and
find it in the jurisdiction over cases arising under the laws of the
United States. The Constitution provides, and federal treaties
may provide, defenses against certain state criminal proceedings,
so those jurisdictional categories should also extend to prosecutions. Next, federal power and federal jurisdiction naturally attach when the foreign relations of the United States are implicated, as they would be by any criminal action against a foreign
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diplomatic or consular officer.7 9 Finally, that admiralty courts
administered criminal law as well as deciding civil disputes was
commonplace at the end of the eighteenth century.0
The limitation of the controversy-denominated heads of jurisdiction-which constitute the second tier of judicial power-to
civil proceedings also makes'good substantive sense. Most of
those cases would be between individuals, so the term that underlines the private nature of such disputes would fit best. Similar reasoning applies to the extent that Article III was designed
to eliminate jurisdictional barriers to lawsuits by private people
against States; those would be civil actions. As for the inter-State
jurisdiction, a sensible drafter would not want to create the impression that the Constitution contemplated the bizarre possibility of a criminal prosecution of one State by another. Finally, the
problem of state-court partiality in suits by States against out-ofstate Americans or foreigners would be especially pronounced in
civil proceedings, where the defendant would not necessarily enjoy the full panoply of common-law protections granted defendants in criminal cases. Although, as I will presently argue, the
Constitution does contemplate the unusual step of committing
the trial of crimes against a State to courts not entirely of that
State, that was an unusual step, not to be taken without good
reason.
ii. State-law criminal prosecutions in federal court. It is easy
enough to conclude that the case-denominated heads of jurisdictions include criminal trials while the controversy-denominated
heads do not. The use of "all" would be even more significant,
however, and its presence even better explained, if it were performing an additional function along similar lines. There is good
reason to believe that it is doing so by indicating that the federal
jurisdiction over cases includes prosecutions under state law.
There are various ways in which the word "all" can clarify
the scope of a statement that uses a plural noun. As Amar says,
there can be doubt as to whether such a noun refers to all members of the class it names or only some of them. He thinks that
' As will appear more fully below, see text accompanying note 90, although ambassadors and public ministers were generally privileged from criminal punishment, consuls
were not. Moreover, there was nothing to keep the United States from entering into a
treaty waiving the privilege for diplomats.
William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *265-66 (describing
criminal jurisdiction of English high court of admiralty) (Chicago 1979); Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution § 1673 at 443-44 (cited in note 48) (American criminal admiralty jurisdiction extensive). Article III, Section 2, clause 3 ensured that all crimes
would be tried to a jury, obviating the fear that federal admiralty courts might follow the
civil law even in prosecutions.

1997]

Limiting FederalJurisdiction

Article III is a context in which the doubt is between the mandatory inclusion of all cases and the mandatory inclusion of some
but not all cases.81 An example is the statement "Students will
come to this event," which might mean either "Some students
will come to this event" or "All students will come to this event."
As I will discuss below, it is very difficult to believe Article III is
that kind of context.
There is, however, a related usage of "all" that makes much
more sense of the text. Sometimes a general noun is used in a
context in which the reader has reason to believe that the noun
nevertheless might refer only to a particular subclass, or that it
might exclude a particular subclass. This ambiguity seems especially likely to arise with respect to rules and commands. Consider, for example, the rule "Vehicles must stop at red lights." No
one would think that meant "There must be some vehicles that
stop at red lights but it does not matter which ones they are."
One nevertheless might think that only some vehicles must stop
at red lights because emergency vehicles are implicitly exempted
from the rule. "All vehicles must stop at red lights" would imply
that even emergency vehicles are included. "All vehicles must
stop at red lights and non-emergency traffic must remain
stopped until the light has turned green" even more clearly implies that emergency vehicles must stop at red lights, in part because it indicates that they then may proceed before the light
turns green.
Just as there may be a presumption that emergency vehicles
are exempt from ordinary traffic laws, American law at the time
of the framing and since has included the expectation that the
courts of one sovereign will not enforce the criminal laws of another. Knowledge of that principle, however, only puts us on
guard to look for the issue in reading Article III. The compound
republic of America recasts traditional notions of sovereignty and
does not necessarily follow any earlier pattern.
Reading Article III with this issue in mind, one notices there
is a tier of jurisdiction in which the maxim does apply, because
there is a set of rules that reaches only controversies, which are
non-criminal cases. One then notices that the earlier rules use
"cases," a word that might reject the maxim because it includes
all lawsuits, civil and criminal. That word, but not the more limited word, is consistently preceded by "all." The word "all," this
pattern suggests, indicates the rule concerning cases is as broad
as it might be. On this account, "all" tells us that in the case" Amar, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1652-53 (cited in note 14).
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denominated heads of jurisdiction, federal courts will entertain
state criminal prosecutions.
Using "all" to indicate that the maxim does not apply, that
the state and federal governments are not foreign to one another
for these purposes, is a familiar employment of the word. It is
also easy to see how it would be desirable for the Constitution to
include state criminal proceedings in the case-denominated
heads of jurisdiction. Moreover, there is reason to believe that
such a reading would have made sense in the early days of the
Constitution. I will consider each of the case-denominated heads
ofjurisdiction in turn.
a) Federal questions. The Constitution contemplates state
prosecutions in which defenses arise from the Constitution, statutes, and treaties. Federal jurisdiction is a way to make sure
those federal defenses stick. One form of federal jurisdiction is
appellate: Congress may arrange for a federal court to review the
work of a state court in order to ensure compliance with federal
law. Sometimes, however, there may be reasons to keep the proceeding out of state court altogether. A state judiciary hostile to
some federal program might so manipulate the trial process as to
make appellate review inadequate, or the cost of trial on a charge
that should have been dismissed might prejudice federal interests. In such situations, full vindication of federal law may require a federal forum from the outset.
Although federal defenses must be fairly tried, they will not
always succeed. Congress, for example, might provide a defense
of good faith but the proof might show bad faith and state-law
guilt besides. When that happens the federal court may be called
upon to enforce a state criminal law. On appeal, the federal court
may affirm the state conviction, thus participating in the infliction of punishment, or even grant execution itself. A federal trial
court in which a federal defense fails will find itself enforcing
state criminal law in a more straightforward way. These familiar
exercises of the federal question jurisdiction depart from the
maxim about penal statutes.
Moreover, the claim that there could be federal jurisdiction
over state criminal proceedings was a respectable, albeit controversial, proposition of law around the time of the framing. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, for example, provided for
federal appellate jurisdiction over state criminal prosecutions in
some circumstances.82 In his 1790 report on the judiciary, Attorney General Randolph proposed to eliminate federal appellate ju1 Stat at 85-86.
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risdiction over state courts by arranging that cases within the
federal jurisdiction would get into federal court as soon as possible. To that end, his draft bill provided for pretrial removal of
cases in state court that presented federal questions.' In 1815,
facing opposition in New England to the War of 1812 and its accompanying taxes and commercial regulations, Congress provided for removal of state-law prosecutions against customs officers for acts done pursuant to federal duty." When a similar provision was included in the Force Act of 1833,85 Senator William
Wilkins of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
maintained that "Congress had the power to give this right in
criminal as well as in civil cases, because the second section of
the third article of the constitution speaks of 'all cases in law and
equity;' and these comprehensive terms cover all." 6
When the issue of removal jurisdiction finally came before
the Supreme Court in 1880, the Court upheld removal.8 " Justice
Strong explained that removal of civil cases under the federal
questions heads had "long since passed beyond doubt," and that
"[t~he judicial power is declared to extend to all cases of the character described, making no distinction between civil and criminal."' The Court clearly was not troubled by the prospect of a
state criminal prosecution proceeding to judgment in a federal
court.8 9
' Edmund Randolph, Report of the Attorney-General to the House of Representatives,
in Maeva Marcus, ed, 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 1789-1800 128, 155 (Columbia 1992).
Nonintercourse Act of 1815 § 8, 3 Stat 195, 198, reenacted by Act of Mar 3, 1815
§ 6, 3 Stat 231, 233-34.
4 Stat at 633.
Joseph Gales and William Winston Seaton, 9 Register of Debates in Congress 261
(Gales and Seaton 1833).
' Tennessee v Davis, 100 US 257, 271 (1880). There are two questions in Davis, one of
which is quite tricky. The first is whether Congress may provide for removal of a state
criminal prosecution that involves a federal question. The second, implicating all the difficulties of Osborn and the so-called "protective jurisdiction," is how much of a federal ingredient it takes to raise a federal question, and whether the presence of an officer who
was acting within the scope of federal duty is enough. Justice Clifford, who dissented in
Davis, seems to have agreed that removal is permissible when the case "involves some
question arising under the Constitution, the laws of Congress, or treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority." Id at 293 (Clifford dissenting) (citation omitted).
Davis, 100 US at 265 (majority opinion).
' To the objection that requiring the State to prosecute criminals in another government's courts violates state sovereignty, Justice Strong answered:
The argument so much pressed upon us, that it is an invasion of the sovereignty of a
State to withdraw from its courts into the courts of the general government the trial
of prosecutions for alleged offenses against the criminal laws of a State, even though
the defence presents a case arising out of an act of Congress, ignores entirely the
dual character of our government. It assumes that the States are completely and in
all respects sovereign. But when the national government was formed, some of the
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b) Foreign officers. State criminal prosecutions in federal
court under the federal question jurisdiction fit naturally into the
constitutional scheme. So do state criminal prosecutions against
consuls under the foreign officer jurisdiction, which extends to
"all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls." On one hand, the rationale for federal jurisdiction over
lawsuits involving foreign officers was clear. Such proceedings
implicated the foreign relations of the United States and hence
should proceed in a competent, independent tribunal that was attached to the interests of the nation as a whole. On the other
hand, consuls, unlike ambassadors and other public ministers,
were subject to all the laws and municipal regulations of the
place where they resided ° In America in 1789 that meant the
laws and regulations of leading seaports, like Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, and Charleston; consuls, unlike public ministers,
were unlikely to be confined to the national seat of government.
Added together, federal-court jurisdiction over consuls and
state substantive authority over them yield application of state
law, including state criminal law, in federal court." This reasoning implies that Congress could provide that offenses by conattributes of State sovereignty were partially, and others wholly, surrendered and
vested in the United States ... . [When the Constitution was adopted, a portion of
that judicial power became vested in the new government created, and so far as thus
vested it was withdrawn from the sovereignty of the State.
Id at 266-67. A mandatory theorist's heart might leap up at the implication that, because
some jurisdiction had been taken away from the States, only federal courts could finally
determine questions within the federal jurisdiction. Justice Strong, however, went on to
note, without any hint of criticism, that the Judiciary Act of 1789 "did not attempt to confer upon the Federal courts all the judicial power vested in the government." Id at 267.
' United States v Ravara, 2 US (2 Dall) 297, 297-98 (Cir Ct D Pa 1793) (consul subject to criminal prosecution); 1 Op Atty Gen 41, 42 (1794) (consul not an ambassador or
public minister because not a representative, and not entitled to privileges of public ministers); 1 Op Atty Gen 77, 78 (1797) (consul not a minister and not privileged from legal
process); Wyndham Beawes, 1 Lex Mercatoria 419 (Baldwin 6th ed 1813) (Joseph Chitty,
ed) (consul not minister, not under protection of the law of nations; doubtful whether consul privileged from arrest); James Kent, Commentary on International Law 131-32
(Deighton, Bell 2d ed 1877) (consuls subject to civil and criminal laws of receiving state);
Henry Wheaton, Elements of InternationalLaw 423 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1863) (William
Beach Lawrence, annotator) (consuls not public ministers; subject to local civil and criminal law). Among the traditional authorities, only Vattel seems to have endorsed consular
immunity from ordinary criminal laws, and he did not do so unequivocally. Emmerich de
Vattel, The Law of Nations 148 (Johnson 1863) (Joseph Chitty, trans) (consul's functions
are "not so great as to procure... the independence enjoyed by public ministers," but do
"seem [ I to require that the consul should be independent of the ordinary criminal justice
of the place where he resides," unless he commits "some enormous crime").
" There is no reason to believe Congress was expected to adopt a criminal code for
consuls, especially because consuls were expected to be subject to all the various local
regulations that might be enforced criminally. See DuPonceau, Dissertationat 33 (cited in
note 54).
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suls against state laws would be prosecuted in federal tribunals.2 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress appears to have
done so. Section 9, which dealt with district courts, gave them
"jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all
suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for offences above
[the general criminal jurisdictional limits given district courts
earlier in the section]."93 Although one might wonder whether
suits include criminal prosecutions, the exclusion of criminal offenses with a punishment above the stated level strongly indicates that a prosecution with potential punishment below that
level would be within the jurisdiction. Section 13 of the 1789 Act
gave the Supreme Court "original, but not exclusive jurisdiction
of all suits . . . in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a

party."94 If Section 9 does indeed tell us that suits include criminal prosecutions, then the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over any criminal prosecution of a consul. Unless consuls
were exempted from the ordinary criminal law of the States, or
federal-court jurisdiction ousted the States' substantive authority, under the 1789 Act state-law prosecutions of consuls could,
and prosecutions of consuls for petty crimes had to, proceed in
federal court.
Although this idea may seem strange to us, and no doubt
seemed strange to some people when the Constitution was new,
it did not seem strange to everyone around the time of the framing. Peter DuPonceau, one of the leaders of the American bar
during the early years under Article III and the 1789 Act, and a
careful student of the intricacies of federal jurisdiction, thought
that this was precisely the correct answer: prosecutions of consuls for violations of state criminal law should proceed in federal
court. DuPonceau reasoned that the judicial power under Article
III extended to cases not covered by any law that Congress was
authorized to adopt, and in particular that it extended to all
cases involving consuls even though Congress lacked authority to
In saying this I am not reading United States v Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7
Cranch) 32 (1812), let alone Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), into the
Constitution. Even if the Constitution contemplates some criminal prosecutions for violations of unwritten federal law (or offenses against the United States that have not been
defined by Congress), or of unwritten general law, it also contemplates some criminal law
that is identifiably the law of a State, such as an ex post facto criminal statute. My point
is that even a dedicated believer in inherent federal judicial power to punish offenses
against federal sovereignty would have agreed that there was such a thing as the criminal law of a State and that a consul could violate it.
" 1 Stat at 77. The criminal jurisdiction of the district courts extended to offenses for
which the punishment was not more than whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine
not exceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months. Id.
' Id at 80-81.
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provide a comprehensive civil and criminal code for consuls.9" He
concluded that state law was applicable, albeit in federal court,
and that in such a case "the federal tribunal is to stand precisely
in the place of the State Judges, and to administer justice in the
particular case, as these should have done, if the jurisdiction had
not been taken from them, and vested elsewhere."96
DuPonceau also maintained that existing decisions favored
his view. One, United States v Ravara, was a criminal prosecution in federal Circuit Court against Joseph Ravara, the
Genovese consul. Ravara was accused of attempting to extort
money from, among others, the British Ambassador and President Washington.97 The case is best known as a federal common
law prosecution-that is, a criminal proceeding brought in federal court in the name of the United States without an explicit
federal criminal statute.9" DuPonceau maintained the underlying
substantive criminal law actually had been that of Pennsylvania.99 Whether DuPonceau was right is a subject of current scholarly dispute.' 0 He was on stronger ground in claiming support
from Chief Justice Tilghman's opinion in Commonwealth v
Kosloff, a rape prosecution against a Russian consul that was
dismissed from Pennsylvania court on the ground that federal jurisdiction over consuls was exclusive.' °' After concluding that his
's DuPonceau, Dissertationat 33-34 (cited in note 54). "It must not be believed that
our Constitution has given to the national legislature powers co-extensive with those that
it has conferred upon the judiciary." Id at 32. DuPonceau then went on to deny that Congress had power to legislate as to any matter that could come up in, for example, a diversity case. As for ministers and consuls in particular, he found it clear "that Congress have
not the power given to them to legislate upon all matters that may affect these personages." Congress could not adopt a complete code for ministers and consuls, nor could it
free consuls from the ordinary laws of the States. Id at 32-33.
Id at 35 (footnote omitted).
2 US (2 Dall) 297 (Cir Ct D Pa 1793).
The fact that the prosecution was pursued by the United States district attorney in
the name of the United States did not necessarily mean the criminal law involved was
federal. In the simplest criminal case, all three important government elements-the law,
the prosecutor, and the court-are associated with the same government. Once that
symmetry is broken, it is not immediately clear which combination is correct. Today we
would say that the law and the prosecutor should go together, whatever court they are in,
but we have had a long time to sort things out.
DuPonceau, Dissertationat 36 (cited in note 54).
"Compare Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 L & Hist Rev
267, 301-05 (1986) (Pennsylvania common law applied), with John D. Gordon III, United
States v. Joseph Ravara- "PresumptuousEvidence," "Too Many Lawyers," and a Federal
Common Law Crime, in Marcus, ed, Origins 106, 137-40 (cited in note 49) (federal common law applied). Gordon points out that DuPonceau had been one of Ravara's counsel
and suggests that DuPonceau remembered the case inaccurately. Id at 107.
1015 Sergeant & Rawle 545 (Oyer & Terminer, Phil, Pa 1816). During his discussion of
the jurisdictional issue, Tilghman observed: "Accordingly we find it provided, by the 2d
sect. of the 3d article of the Constitution, that the judicial power shall extend 'to all cases
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court lacked jurisdiction, Tilghman gave a broad hint that Kosloff
should be prosecuted in federal court, probably under Pennsylvania law." 2 Such a prosecution was one reasonable solution to the
puzzle posed by federal jurisdiction based on the identity of consuls rather than the applicable law.
c) Admiralty and maritime cases. If this thesis is sound, the

Constitution also permits Congress to include state criminal
prosecutions under the admiralty jurisdiction. The rationale for
doing so is just the extension to criminal cases of the rationale for
the admiralty jurisdiction generally. Matters connected with
ships and shipping implicated the foreign commercial and political relations of the United States. Freedom from local bias would
keep the new Republic out of a lot of trouble. If that was true
about disputes over mariners' wages, it was also true about
affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers, and Consuls.' Words more comprehensive
cannot be devised. They include suits of every kind civil, and criminal." Id at 548.
Tilghman had earlier rejected the claim that consuls are immune from criminal prosecution, distinguishing them from ambassadors and public ministers. Id at 545-47. In 1806
Tilghman had written the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissing a
civil suit against a consul on the grounds that the federal jurisdiction was exclusive.
(DuPonceau represented the consul.) See Mannhardt v Soderstrom, 1 Binney 138, 144-45
(Pa 1806).
In South Carolina the state courts exercised criminal jurisdiction over consuls, holding that federal jurisdiction was not exclusive. State v De La Foret, 2 Nott & McCord 217,
222-25 (Const Ct SC 1820) (3d ed 1860). In that case Justice Abraham Nott of the South
Carolina Constitutional Court, dissenting, argued that the federal jurisdiction over consuls was exclusive because of the word "all." Id at 228-29. His form of two-tierism, however, seems not to have been Amar's, but rather the strain according to which federal exclusivity meant real exclusivity: he appears to have believed a state court could not decide, even in the first instance, a case that arose directly under federal law. Id at 229.
Justice Huger, writing for the majority, had this to say about Nott's textual criticism:
I cannot perceive, that the introduction of the word 'all' has produced the smallest effect on the meaning of this section. Were it omitted altogether, or attached to every
branch of the section, its meaning would be the same. 'My estate' means all my estate, and 'all my estate' can mean nothing more than my estate.
Id at 223 (emphasis omitted).
1"' But upon mature reflection, I am unable to deny, that the Courts of the United
States can take cognizance, when I find it written in the Constitution, that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting a Consul. Is he not affected
in criminal cases, much more than in civil? How then can I say, that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction? But how, or by what law is he to be punished, in case of
conviction? Shall he be punished by the law of Pennsylvania, where the offence was
committed, inasmuch as there is no other express law which reaches his case?
Kosloff, 5 Sergeant & Rawle at 551. That language, combined with his reaching out to decide the unnecessary question of consular privilege, suggests the Chief Justice hoped
Kosloff would not go free.
William Rawle, another member of the eminent Philadelphia bar in the early period,
evidently thought Kosloff should have been prosecuted in federal court under general
principles of the social compact-unwritten law associated with the federal government.
See Rawle, View of the Constitution at 265-66 (cited in note 71).
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crimes committed on board ship, in which foreigners might be
perpetrators, victims, witnesses, or otherwise interested.
Federal admiralty jurisdiction over state criminal prosecutions was also consistent with standard principles of law at the
time of the framing. First, as noted above, criminal admiralty jurisdiction was well established in 1787.' Next, it seems very
likely that the substantive lawmaking power of the States and
the federal admiralty jurisdiction overlapped. States retained
some authority to make law having to do with maritime matters;
that is shown by the Saving to Suitors Clause of the 1789 Act,
which preserved some state-court common law remedies in maritime disputes. °4 Moreover, the power of the States to define and
punish crimes extended to harbors, bays, and rivers within a
State.0 5 The 1789 Act extended the admiralty jurisdiction to
events taking place on waters within States, including for example seizures made on "waters which are navigable from the sea
by vessels of ten or more tons burthen."' Add up these propositions and you get state criminal laws enforced in federal admiralty courts (with, of course, trial by jury).
d) General considerations. In the discussion so far of legal
principles around the time of the framing I have been careful not
to go beyond saying that the position I suggest was reasonable.

See text accompanying note 80.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77.
'"In United States v Bevans, 16 US (3 Wheat) 336 (1818), Chief Justice Marshall
found that Boston Harbor was within the jurisdiction of the State of Massachusetts for
purposes of a federal statute punishing crimes outside the jurisdiction of any State:
As the powers of the respective governments now stand, if two citizens of Massachusetts step into shallow water when the tide flows, and fight a duel, are they not
within the jurisdiction, and punishable by the laws, of Massachusetts? If these questions must be answered in the affirmative, and we believe they must, then the bay in
which this murder was committed, is not out of the jurisdiction of a state ....
Id at 389. Marshall separated the question of the State's power to make law for its waters
from the question of the relative jurisdiction of federal and state courts. Id at 386-87. See
also Thomas Sergeant, ConstitutionalLaw 194 (2d ed 1830) (States retain general jurisdiction over waters within their territory.).
'"Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat at 77. The district courts had "exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.., within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas." Id. The judicial districts generally were
defined by States; the Connecticut District, for example, consisted of the State of Connecticut. Id § 2, 1 Stat at 73. It seems the drafters of the 1789 Act thought there was admiralty jurisdiction within the territorial limits of the States, or some of them.
This conclusion is independent of one's views on the comparative merits of The
Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 US (10 Wheat) 428, 429 (1825) (Admiralty jurisdiction
is limited to ebb and flow of the tide.), and The PropellerGenesee Chief, 53 US (12 How)
443, 457 (1851) (American admiralty jurisdiction extends to all navigable waters.). At the
time of the framing, the States included many bays and rivers that felt the tide, such as
Boston Harbor.
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Issues of federalism, and especially judicial federalism, were extremely controversial in those days, probably even more so than
they are today. To expect anything like unanimity would be foolish.' 7 That said, it is possible to object to my argument on the
ground that the prosecution of state crimes in federal courts
would have seemed simply beyond the pale because it was inconsistent with the idea of dual federalism, according to which the
state and federal governments were to have little contact with
one another. State prosecutions belong in state court and federal
prosecutions belong in federal court.
My proposed reading of Article III is also inconsistent with
one strand of coterminous power theory. Coterminous power theory was an understanding of the federal system shared by many,
but by no means all, commentators at and soon after the framing.
It held that federal legislative, executive, and judicial power necessarily have the same scope. The main application of this principle in debates over sovereignty was as a ground for impeaching
the Supreme Court's impartiality between the States and the
Union. Critics of the Court, invoking the maxim of coterminous
power, claimed it was biased because its federal question jurisdiction expanded whenever it upheld a congressional statute
against the claim that Congress had exceeded its enumerated
powers. The most extreme form of coterminous power thinking
also worked in the other direction, maintaining that where there
was federal court jurisdiction, there was also substantive congressional power. This last conclusion is inconsistent with my
reading, according to which it is possible to have federal jurisdiction but state legislative authority.'
Neither the strongest form of dual federalism nor the
strongest form of the coterminous power principle, however, was
invariably endorsed in the Constitution's early years. Congress,
after all, provided for federal removal of state prosecutions as
early as 1815."9 Moreover, although there was much opposition
to the suggestion that federal criminal prosecutions could go forward in state courts, as Michael Collins has recently pointed out
a number of leading authorities-Tucker, Sergeant, and Rawle-'"It

would also be foolish to think that commentators' political views did not affect

their legal opinions. By relying on DuPonceau, for example, I do not mean to suggest he
did not have an agenda. I do think, however, that the arguments he mustered in support
of his agenda tell us something about the range of acceptable argument.
"See White, Recovering CoterminousPower Theory at 68-70, 76-85 (cited in note 49).
White does not suggest there was a coterminous power monolith; rather, his point is that
coterminous power theory provided a set of frequently invoked premises that are difficult
for us to understand today. Id at 69-72, 78-85.
'+Nonintercourse Act § 8, 3 Stat at 198.
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were prepared to countenance the practice to some extent."0 Coterminous power theory was always strongest when asserting
that the federal courts had every incentive to expand the legislative sphere of Congress because their sphere would expand with
it; the notion that federal-court jurisdiction necessarily brought
with it substantive congressional power seems to have been the
weaker side, one on which opinion was very much divided."'
Something deeper is also at work here. The product of the
Federal Convention embodied a variety of innovations and compromises. One novel intermediate measure was the Supremacy
Clause, which made the law of the United States the law of every
State and charged the state judiciaries to treat that law as their
own."' As for the new federal court system, it had two unusual
features. First, federal jurisdiction extended to cases that involved both state and federal law and to cases that involved no
federal law at all. Second, because inferior federal courts were
optional and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was
limited, there could be some cases, including federal question
cases, in which federal jurisdiction was exclusively appellate.
Those cases would have to begin in state court if they were to begin anywhere, which confirms the implication that state courts
were to administer federal law as their law."'
It can take a while to work out the implications of such an
innovative, not to mention complicated, system. If the new ar"'Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis L Rev 39, 84-96. See Rawle, View of the Constitution at 264-65 (cited in
note 71); Sergeant, Constitutional Law at 269 n (i) (cited in note 105); Tucker, ed, 1
Blackstone's Commentaries at 182 (cited in note 45). Collins discusses some of the shortcomings of an earlier classic article on this subject, Charles Warren, Federal Criminal
Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv L Rev 545 (1925). Collins, 1995 Wis L Rev at 84-89.
.'Justice Iredell in Chisholm, for example, said that the federal judicial power went
as far as the federal executive and legislative power and then went further, to controversies not within the special competence of the general government. Chisholm v Georgia, 2
US (2 Dall) 419, 435-36 (1793) (Iredell dissenting). DuPonceau said the same thing.
DuPonceau, Dissertation at 32 (cited in note 54). In his elementary constitutional law
treatise, Justice Story explained the federal question jurisdiction on the grounds that "the
judicial power ought to be co-extensive with the legislative and executive powers," and
then went on to give different rationales for the other heads of jurisdiction. Joseph Story,
The ConstitutionalClassBook 132 (Hilliard, Gray 1834).
"MAs has been pointed out many times, the Supremacy Clause was a substitute for a
congressional negative on state laws. The classic, much-quoted, statement of the result is
by Hamilton in Federalist 82, which explains that the laws of the States and the Union
together make "ONE WHOLE." Federalist 82 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The
FederalistPapers491, 493 (Mentor 1961).
"'By using that phrase I do not mean to endorse any particular position on the debate
surrounding cases like Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356 (1990), and Testa v Katt, 330 US 386
(1947), which consider state courts' obligations to entertain causes of action created by
federal law. I think this is a very subtle problem.

1997]

LimitingFederalJurisdiction

243

rangement did not completely square with some observers' theoretical principles, those observers would hammer on it until it
did fit. That does not mean, however, that they were not hammering. Dual federalism, under which state and federal spheres
are kept apart from one another by what has been called constitutional preemption, is only a gloss on the Constitution." 4 It
avoids some of the complexities that come from combining state
and federal law into a single system. If the Supremacy Clause
combines them, however, then the complexities avoided by dual
federalism are the Constitution's own. Just as we must do all we
can to understand earlier thinking in terms of its own categories,
so we must be aware that earlier thinkers may have been acting
on their own preconceptions in interpreting this novel phenomenon. If dual federalism is an historically authentic strand in
American constitutional thought, so is James Madison's insistence that the Constitution's system of divided sovereignty cannot be captured in any formula."5
2. Mandatory and permissive tiers.
If the foregoing is correct, there are two tiers of federal jurisdiction and the difference between the two is that the first tier
extends to criminal cases, including criminal cases under state
law. Amar's two-tier theory, by contrast, maintains that under
Section 2 of Article III, the jurisdiction of some federal court
must extend to all lawsuits described in the case-denominated
heads of jurisdiction and some lawsuits described in each of the
controversy-denominated heads. This reading is subject to a series of substantive and textual objections. The first, most obvious, substantive objection is so plain that it need not detain us
long. It is impossible to imagine any reason for setting a floor on
the controversy-denominated jurisdiction where this theory sets
it. Why, for example, require that at least two lawsuits in which
"'The term "constitutional preemption" comes from Alfred Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colun L Rev 1024 (1967).
Dual federalism builds on one of the basic structural features of the Constitution: that the
federal government acts directly on the people, not just on the States. The extreme form
of this principle has the federal government acting only on the people, not on the States
at all, and has the Constitution carving up spheres of authority for the two levels of government; the two spheres are then treated more like two territorially distinct countries
than like one country with two levels of government.
..Madison wrote to Daniel Webster in 1830: '"e actual system of Government for
the United States is so unexampled in its origin, so complex in its structure, and so peculiar in some of its features, that in describing it the political vocabulary does not furnish
terms sufficiently distinctive and appropriate, without a detailed resort to the facts of the
case." Letter from James Madison to William Webster (May 27, 1830), in 4 Letters and
Other Writings ofJames Madison 84, 85 (Worthington 2d ed 1884).
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the United States is a party be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts? Indeed, Amar does not seem to take this possibility
seriously himself."' His response so far to such difficulties has
been that his theory accounts for the text while no other can."7
There are three textual problems with Amar's account, however. First, his reading fares poorly under his own canon that it
is vital to account for, and if possible give significance to, every
word. Article III shifts, not from "all cases" to "cases," but from
"all cases" to "controversies." According to Amar, cases and controversies are the same thing; the switch to a synonym is done to
emphasize the dropping of "all."" 8 That interpretation is certainly creative, but normally adjectives modify nouns, not the
other way around. He has not explained the change in nouns.
Second, few if any readers of Article III would reach Amar's
interpretation, because his reading does not reflect the way "all"
is used, either today or, as far as I can tell, in 1787. One very
common use of that word is for clarity or emphasis. I argued
above that Article III uses it to clarify a statement; without "all"
before "cases," one might wonder whether prosecutions under
state law are included. To be sure, the substantive logic of the
Constitution would lead to the conclusion that state criminal
proceedings do come within the case-denominated heads of juris-

116

Arguably, federal courts must have the power to hear at least some miniscule

subset of cases in each of the last six categories; the use of the plural,
'Controversies,' suggests that 'the judicial Power shall extend to [at least two] Controversies' in each category. As any such restriction on congressional power would be
both trivial and practically unenforceable, I shall for expository ease follow the principle de minimis non curat lex, and speak as if Congress could abolish all jurisdiction
in these categories.
Amar,65 BU L Rev at 240 n 119 (cited in note 14).
.. Amar, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1651 (cited in note 14).
"'Amar's initial response to the possibility that the switch from cases to controversies
marks the switch from a category that includes civil and criminal cases to one that includes only civil cases was to deny the case-controversy distinction and say instead that
"the different wording simply represents yet another way-in addition to the selective
usage of 'all' and the distinction between party-defined and subject matter-defined jurisdiction-in which the first three jurisdictional categories were set off as structurally different from the last six." Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 244 n 128 (cited in note 14). (The casedenominated heads of jurisdiction are not all based on subject matter, unless a great deal
of stress is placed on "affecting" in the foreign officer jurisdiction. That is why I keep using that cumbersome name rather than referring to them as the subject-matter heads of
jurisdiction. Moreover, controversies between citizens of the same State claiming lands
under grants of different States are defined as much by their subject matter as by their
participants.) Amar's latest response is, "So what if 'cases' and 'controversies' mean different things? How does that account for the fact that the judicial power shall extend to
'all' [criminal and civil]
cases in the first tier, but not necessarily all [civil] controversies
in the second?" Amar, 138 U Pa L Rev at 1657 (cited in note 14) (brackets in original). I
am trying to answer that question here.
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diction. Adding "all" makes it easier to reach that conclusion and
more certain that one will do so.
This is how the Constitution uses "all" in other places. Everywhere else in the document other than the paragraphs at issue here, "all" either clarifies or emphasizes what was clear already."' The clarifying or emphasizing usage also appears in the
"'The following are the passages, in addition to the first two paragraphs of Article III,
Section 2, in which "all" appears in the Constitution of 1787. It seems to me that in every
one "all" clarifies without changing the sense of the statement, sometimes because it is
simply a synonym for "the."
1. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States." Art I, § 1.
2. The number of persons in a State for purposes of apportionment shall include the
whole number of free persons plus "three fifths of all other Persons." Art I, § 2, cl 3.
3. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." Art I, § 3, cl 6.
4. Senators and Representatives "shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace" be privileged from arrest during their sessions. Art I, § 6, cl 1.
5. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." Art
I, § 7, cl 1.
6. "[1n all such Cases [of presidential veto] the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays." Art I, § 7, cl 2.
7. Congress shall have power to levy taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, "but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Art I, § 8, cl 1.
8. Congress shall have power to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" over the federal capitol territory. Art I, § 8, cl 17.
9. Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction "over all Places purchased" from the States for "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings." Art I, § 8, cl 17.
10 & 11. Congress shall have power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution." Art I, § 8, cl 18.
12. A "regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time." Art I, § 9, cl 7.
13 & 14. When States, with Congress's consent, lay such duties on imports or exports
as may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws, "the net Produce of all
Duties ... shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress." Art I, § 10, cl 2.
15-17. The electors "shall make a List of all the Persons voted for," the President of
the Senate shall "open all the Certificates" of the electoral votes, and when the House of
Representatives chooses the President "a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
Choice." Art H, § 1, cl 3.
18. The President shall nominate and appoint "Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States."
Art II, § 2, cl 2.
19. "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate." Art II, § 2, cl 3.
20. The President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United States." Art H, § 3,
ci 1.
21. "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States" may be
removed by impeachment and conviction. Art II, § 4.
22. "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." Art
III, § 2, cl 3.
23. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens of the several States." Art IV, § 2, cl 1.
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Articles of Confederation. For example, the Articles gave "the
United States, in Congress assembled.., the sole and exclusive
right and power . . . of establishing rules for deciding, in all

cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal," and of
"establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals
in all cases of captures." 12 When a power is sole and exclusive it
would be very hard to conclude that it extends only to some of the
instances2 enumerated; "all" here is clarifying, and clarifying only
slightly.1 '

For Amar, however, "all" is not clarifying or emphasizing: it
is changing the sense of the sentence from one clear meaning to
another. If "all" did not appear, and Section 2 simply referred to
cases and then to controversies, no one would think that all cases
but only some controversies were included. Article III without
"all" would not be ambiguous or unclear. It would clearly mean
something other than what Amar says the actual text means.
This is more than clarification. To be sure, sometimes adding
"all" does change the sense of a statement. For example, "Deer
walk through my back yard" means that some deer do so and is
clear enough. "All deer walk through my back yard" means something else. That change of meaning is a standard way to use "all,"
but it is not the usage Amar attributes to Article III. If it contained no "all"s, the first paragraph of section 2 would not be
read as implicitly including "some," the way the statement about
deer would be; it most naturally would be read as referring to all
cases and all controversies within the described categories. Amar
maintains that the addition of three "all"s to a sentence that already has five implicit "al"s subtracts two of the implicit ones
and changes them to "some."
24. "The Congress shall have Power to .dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."
Art IV,§ 3, cl 2.
25. Amendments, when ratified, "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes" as part of
the Constitution. Art V.
26. "All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into" before the Constitution
shall continue to be valid. Art VI,cl 1.
27. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Art VI, cl 2.
28. "[AIll executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States" shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. Art VI, cl 3.
"Articles of Confederation, Art IX, cl 1, reprinted in 1 Stat 4, 6 (1845).
"' In similar fashion, Article IX goes on to say that the "United States in Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort on appeal, in all disputes and differences" concerning state boundaries, id at cl2, 1 Stat at 6, and gives the same authority with respect to
"[a]ll controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under different grants of
two or more States," id at cl 3, 1 Stat at 7. No one would think "all" makes any difference.
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No one uses English that way. Amar has pointed to no instance in which anyone has sought to imply a "some" by adding
an "all" to a sentence in which "all" already was implicit. 2 As far
as I know, the language has no such convention. Up to this point,
Amar has fallen back on the claim that there is nothing else the
words of Article III could mean.
The third textual objection is the converse of the second. Article III, I have just argued, is not a natural way of conveying
what Amar says it conveys. Moreover, someone who wanted to
say what Amar claims the Federal Convention wanted to say
would have written something else. This is so for two reasons.
First, the problem with Amar's intricate word game is that it is
an intricate word game. If he is correct, the text waited almost
two hundred years for its true interpreter. Constitution drafters
do not engage in secret writing, because to do so will cause their
enterprise to fail. If Amar's reading had been what the framers
wanted to get across, they would have drafted something else." 3
Second, there was an obvious way for the framers to have conveyed Amar's message, but it is not his way. The language does
have a form of words that contrasts statements that apply to
every member of a class with statements that apply only to some
members of that class. A well known example is "All animals are
equal but some animals are more equal than others."'2 4
D. The Supreme Court
When Article III finally talks about jurisdiction, it deals only
with that of the Supreme Court. The Constitution sets out the

'"The parade of examples in which the presence and absence of all" do not together
imply "some" includes the Appointments Clause, which provides that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme court, and
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law.
US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2. No one thinks (I hope) that Congress could comply with this by
providing that the Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices, two of whom shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, the remainder of whom shall be named by joint ballot of the Senate and House.
"By contrast, if the drafters were assuming the criminal-civil distinction their plan
worked so well that few people even notice it. There is today federal jurisdiction over
criminal proceedings, including criminal proceedings under state law, in the casedenominated but not the controversy-denominated heads of jurisdiction. Compare Tennessee v Davis, 100 US 257 (1879) (When a federal question is raised, removal of a state
criminal case to federal court is constitutional.), with Wisconsin v Pelican Insurance Co,
127 US 265 (1888) (Original jurisdiction over controversies to which a state is a party
does not extend to penal actions.).
' George Orwell, Animal Farm 148 (Harcourt 2d ed 1954) (capitalization altered).
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Court's original jurisdiction and then provides that it shall have
appellate jurisdiction in all the other cases previously mentioned,
subject to Congress's power to make exceptions and regulations.
According to the standard account, the original jurisdiction is beyond congressional control. Congress may neither add to nor subtract from it, although it is now generally accepted that Congress
may create concurrent jurisdiction in inferior federal courts. Orthodoxy treats the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as mandatory on Congress.
Rising to the challenge, Amar maintains that orthodoxy is
wrong about this too. He finds two tiers everywhere. Once again,
"all" is the key. Article III provides that "In all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction." According to Amar there is a missing "all"
before "those," which implies the Constitution really means
"some of those."'2 5
The textual argument for the standard reading is straightforward and consistent with the account of the Extending Clause
developed above. The clause sets out the Court's original jurisdiction. It is mandatory in the sense that any constitutional rule is
mandatory: only the power that made the rule can change it, and
Congress is not that power. The clause itself, therefore, confers
on the Court the power to hear and decide those cases within its
original jurisdiction. Congress may need to pass some.laws that
are necessary and proper for the Court to perform its function,
but then Congress must pass many such laws for the government
to operate. As for concurrent jurisdiction in the lower courts, the
Constitution does not say that only the Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction over those cases, and it does extend to them the
judicial power, which it vests in both supreme and inferior
courts.
The use of the word "all" in this paragraph is consistent with
the orthodox account of the text defended here. According to the
reading just presented, "all" is doing little if any work. At most it
reinforces what would in any event be the natural reading. Suppose the text instead read, "In Cases affecting Ambassadors ...
and those in which a State shall be party, the supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction. In the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction ......
It is very unlikely that anyone would think the original jurisdiction extended only to some of the foreign officer cases or that the
"'Amar,56 U Chi L Rev at 480-83 (cited in note 14).
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appellate jurisdiction extended only to some of the other cases
listed in the first paragraph. As noted above, this is the way "all"
repeatedly functions in the Constitution.
To be sure, by this account the Supreme Court paragraph
does not use "all" to reinforce the point that cases include both
civil and criminal proceedings. But there is no reason for it do to
so, because all that work has been done in the preceding paragraph. Once it is established that the second paragraph is allocating jurisdiction over the cases and controversies already enumerated, the distinction between cases and controversies is built
in. Thus, when the text refers to all the other cases before mentioned, it includes only civil proceedings in the controversydenominated heads of jurisdiction because the first paragraph
included only civil proceedings.'2 6
Amar's mandatory-permissive division once again encounters serious textual difficulties. It makes sense to have a permissive tier only if Congress has power to remove cases from the
Court's original jurisdiction. Doing so is different from adding
them to the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, which it can do
with the power to constitute those tribunals. But Congress has
no express authority over the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, a point that seems especially telling given its explicit
power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Amar is left to argue that taking cases out of
the Court's original docket is necessary and proper to carry into
execution either the powers of the inferior courts, which seems
strange, or of the Supreme Court itself, which seems very

strange. 127
One more problem awaits Amar's two-tier theory in this
paragraph. The last sentence, which deals with the Court's appellate jurisdiction, encompasses "all the other Cases before
mentioned" (subject to Congress's exceptions power, whatever it
is exactly). What is this "all" doing? It is not contrasting with a
parallel formulation from which "all" is missing, thereby signaling that the parallel formulation implicitly includes the word
"some," because there is no parallel formulation-no list of con"The orthodox view of the Court's original jurisdiction, under which it extends only
to those State-party cases that come to federal court because a State is a party, and thus
excludes federal question and admiralty cases that have a State as a party but that lack
diversity, is challenged in Pfander, 82 Cal L Rev at 560-61 (cited in note 44). Pfander's
thesis is not closely related to that of this paper, so I will pause only to note that if both
Osborn v Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824), and Texas v White, 74
US (7 Wall) 700 (1868), are still good precedent, under this theory the Court probably has
original jurisdiction over every case in which a State is a party.
'"Amar, 56 U Chi L Rev at 481-83 (cited in note 14).
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troversies, not even a "those." Apparently the Constitution, in the
course of a single paragraph, has returned to the practice it
adopts everywhere else, of using "all" as a synonym for "the" or a
clarification that general language really is totally inclusive.
III.

STRUCTURE

Read all the text together and you can see the constitutional
structure. Amar maintains that if we look at the forest and not
the trees, the shape of the forest will support his reading. The
independence of the federal courts, which consists in their institutional separation from the other two branches and their judges'
protected tenure and salary, is part of the larger picture. Protection and independence distinguish the federal courts from the
state courts, leading Amar, like others, to the conclusion that the
state courts cannot have been meant to be the ultimate guarantors of federal constitutional limitations. 8
Amar's structural argument works like this: The Constitution is designed to set up a complete government, with all three
branches of its own. Unlike the Confederation, it is not supposed
to make the national government dependent on the States for its
operations; that is the difference that comes with having a national executive and a national judiciary. Moreover, the new national judiciary has structural features-national appointment,
protected tenure, and national accountability-that distinguish it
sharply from the state judiciaries. The state judiciaries are thus
no more a replacement for the national courts than the state
Governors are for the President. In light of all this, it cannot be
that the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide whether to
have a fully functioning national judiciary that can play its independent role in the new constitutional scheme, any more than
the Constitution leaves it to Congress whether to have a President. Any reading that gives Congress such power, and thereby
threatens the completeness of the new national government and
the resulting separation of powers, cannot be right. Thus, in particular, the federal courts must have authority to resolvefinally, at least-all federal jurisdiction litigation.
Traditionalists, however, do not suggest Congress has power
to eliminate the federal courts as an independent branch of the
national government. According to the traditional reading, at an
"See Amar, 65 BU L Rev at 229-38 (cited in note 14). I use the phrase "ultimate
guarantors" in deference to Hart, who introduced it into the debate. See Hart and
Wechsler at 423 (cited in note 4). Were I writing on a clean slate the phrase would be
"ultimate judicial guardians." The failure to make that distinction is one of the besetting
sins of this debate.
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absolute minimum there must be a Supreme Court with the
original jurisdiction set out in Article III and with enough appellate jurisdiction to constitute a rule to which congressionally
mandated exceptions are indeed exceptions. In order to make his
argument plausible, then, Amar must move from the independent existence of the federal courts to a claim about their necessary jurisdiction. The structural principle on which he relies is
therefore not simply the independent stature of the federal
courts, but coextensiveness: the notion that the constitutional
structure tells us the federal courts must have the last word on
federal law.
As indicated above, coterminous power is a venerable principle. It is very doubtful, however, that it is the Constitution's
principle. The most glaring departure from coextensiveness is the
one remarked on by DuPonceau and many others: the federal
courts have jurisdiction over quite a few cases in which none of
the substantive law comes from the Constitution, a federal statute, or a federal treaty.'2 9 If federal jurisdiction may, at Congress's pleasure, depart from coextensiveness by including cases
with no federal question, it is hard to see what is wrong with departing by excluding some cases with a federal question.
Article III departs from coextensiveness. Moreover, it does
not give to federal question cases special treatment that would
indicate special structural status. If Clinton is right and all the
heads of jurisdiction are alike, federal questions are just one
among nine. Even if Amar is right and the case-denominated
heads are more fundamental than the controversy-denominated
heads, it is still not true that federal questions are special, other
than by coming first. Federal question cases get the same treatment as foreign officer cases and admiralty cases.
Foreign officer and admiralty jurisdiction (especially the latter) are not merely federal question jurisdiction in disguise. 30 At
the time of the framing, admiralty, while a subject of federal interest, was only sometimes a subject of federal law.' 3 ' Rather,
most admiralty cases would have been expected to turn on the
general commercial law, which was derived from the practice of
merchants and of the courts of commercial nations. Federal law
'"The best known example of this is the diversity jurisdiction, but in 1789 the same
would have been true for a great many admiralty cases, which would have been decided
under the general commercial or maritime law.
'"Amar is correct that a federal question that comes up in an admiralty or maritime
action comes into federal court under only the admiralty jurisdiction, because the federal
question jurisdiction extends only to cases in law and equity.
...
See Stewart Jay, Origins of FederalCommon Law: PartTwo, 133 U Pa L Rev 1231,
1266-67 (1985).
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would apply when Congress had passed a statute pursuant to
one of its enumerated powers, and state law would apply when
the applicable choice of law rules pointed to a local rule that
varied from the general law.'3 2 The modern approach, which
eliminates the category of general law and makes admiralty part
of federal law even in the absence of congressional legislationand, in fact, even in the absence of a grant of power to Congress-is just that: the modern approach.'33 It is anachronistic to
think that at the time of the framing admiralty cases always or
even usually would have involved federal questions.'
The Constitution clearly envisions an independent federal
judiciary, but it does not imply Amar's mandatory version of the
principle of coextensiveness.' 3 ' Nor does it imply his principle of
structural superiority, which amounts to disdain for state courts.
Whatever moderns may think, and whatever many participants
in the ratification debates said in an attempt to justify the existence of a federal judiciary, the Constitution is not drafted on the
principle that state courts are unreliable. The document that
emerged from the Federal Convention said almost nothing about
state criminal law, almost nothing about state criminal procedure, and almost nothing about the structure of the state judiciaries. It thus left the citizens' lives, as well as their liberty and
property, pretty much in the hands of courts and legal systems
that Amar thinks the framers would not trust with the Duty of
"The old system, in which choice of law rules could point a federal court to state,
federal, or general law, is lucidly explained and documented in William A. Fletcher, The
General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv L Rev 1513 (1984). Fletcher explains that "[b]ecause of the character of most disputes in admiralty, few admiralty cases were governed by local law. But
in those cases in which local law provided the relevant rule of decision, federal admiralty
courts did not hesitate to follow it." Id at 1531. The general law administered in federal
admiralty courts (and in federal diversity courts and in state courts) was not federal law:
state courts were not bound by the Supremacy Clauses to follow it as expounded by federal courts. Id at 1558-62.
" The proof of the pudding here is the fact that it was not until fairly late that the
Supreme Court decided that the principles of commercial and navigation law announced
in federal admiralty courts had the same effect under the Supremacy Clause as acts of
Congress. See Southern Pacific Co v Jensen, 244 US 205, 215 (1917). That doctrine was
unknown through most of the nineteenth century and certainly to the framers. In saying
this I do not mean to deny that the Federal Convention sought to ensure uniform law on
maritime matters. The Constitution provides for that uniformity, however, through the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and Congress's power to make that jurisdiction exclusive. That technique is more complicated than simple "preemption."
"It is also possible to have a case involving a consul in which the only real federal
question is one of jurisdiction, but the point is stronger with respect to admiralty.
"It
is common ground in this debate that the Constitution authorizes the resolution
of every federal question case by a federal court. Indeed, on the orthodox reading that is
the Constitution's default option: if Congress does not exercise its exceptions power every
federal question case will be within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
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Tonnage Clause."' Something has to give here, and it should be
the contempt for state courts.
There is a still more serious, methodological difficulty with
Amar's argument. The difficulty is that structural principles
such as coextensiveness, even if identified correctly, generally
lack resolving power in deciding questions of detail. This is so
because structural principles are not constitutional rules, or even
the aggregate of constitutional rules. Rather, they are hypothesized guidelines for design. Consider judicial independence itself.
In one sense that phrase can be used simply to label the fact that
judges appointed pursuant to Article III may be removed from office only by impeachment and conviction. In that sense, though,
to speak of judicial independence adds nothing. It is more interesting to talk about judicial independence in the sense that refers
to the ability of the courts to operate without being subject to the
control of the other branches of government. That is a guideline
for design.
Guidelines for design are more abstract and general than
concrete constitutional provisions. The principle of judicial independence is more abstract than the protected tenure that actually appears in the Constitution. The result of this conceptual
relationship is that guidelines for design-structural principles
of the kind Amar relies on-do not determine the content of the
rules. Rather, there usually will be various potential implementations that are all consistent with the same principle. Different
sets of rules will achieve the goal of the principle in different
ways and to different degrees. Judicial independence, for example, is consistent with the Constitution as we have it, with one in
which a simple majority vote of the Senate is sufficient for conviction upon impeachment, and with one in which a three-fourths
vote is required for conviction. To say there should be judicial independence is not to say how much independence there must be.
Nor is long tenure with difficult removal the only way to ensure
decisions by courts will be free from executive or legislative influence. Juries also serve that end, but do so through their brief
tenure. The desideratum of independence does not dictate the
manner in which it is pursued any more than it dictates the extent to which it is pursued.
Design principles underdetermine structural rules. Indeed,
most of the hard work in constitutional design comes not in identifying the appropriate principles, but in deciding precisely how
and to what extent to implement them. As the proceedings of the
'"US Const, Art I, § 10, cl 12.
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Federal Convention demonstrate, the crucial question usually is
not whether, but how and how much. One question the Convention had to address repeatedly was whether to implement a principle by putting a rule about it into the document or by giving
Congress the power to make a decision.
Article I, Section'10 contains examples of both approaches. It
is a principle of design, for example, that state involvement in
naval warfare implicates national interests and should be subject
to some form of national control. That principle, however, does
not itself decide whether the Constitution should regulate the
matter or empower Congress to do so. Section 10 splits the principle: States are forbidden from granting letters of marque and
reprisal, but the question whether they may keep warships in
time of peace is left for Congress to decide. In similar fashion,
Section 10 forbids any State from entering into a treaty, alliance,
or confederation, while leaving to Congress the decision whether
States may enter into agreements or compacts with foreign powers.
In drawing the fine distinction between a treaty and a compact, the Federal Convention was not simply applying the principle that relations between States and foreign countries are a federal concern. It was also making nice judgments of policy on
other grounds, drawing distinctions beyond the resolving power
of the general principle, and perhaps recognizing that many principles have exceptions that cannot be foreseen in advance.
The principle of coextensiveness, if it is to be attributed to
the Constitution, is no different from the principle that state relations with foreign sovereigns raise federal-level issues: it could
be implemented either with a constitutional requirement that
the federal courts finally resolve all questions of federal law, or
with a power in Congress to provide that they shall do so. Which
implementation is better depends on additional considerations
not contained in the principle itself.
To take what may be the most common phenomenon, the
principle must compete with others, such as the notion that the
government should not make the citizens' lives inconvenient. The
latter guideline underlies the reason most frequently given during the ratification debates for allowing Congress to curtail federal jurisdiction: the inconvenience, particularly for those of ordinary wealth, of protracted litigation. Especially if there were
only a few federal courts, all of them appellate, it might not be
worth the parties' money to have every case with a federal ques-
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tion decided in federal court.'37 This possibility suggests why the
Constitution might implement the principle of coextensiveness in
a way that gives Congress substantial discretion over the actual
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3 '
Principles interact and they compete with one another. One
of the most important applications of that general truth obtains
with special force in this context. Virtually every principle, every
desideratum, of constitutional design is subject to limitation on
the basis of the master principle of constitutional design: power
is dangerous. For this reason, Presidents and Article III judges
have fixed terms, except that they are subject to impeachment,
conviction, and removal. Similarly, Representatives and Senators
are free from arrest during their session, but only to a limited extent. And the President appoints officers, with the advice and
consent of the Senate. And so on and so on. From the standpoint
of any principle, checks inserted because of the possibility of
abuse will seem incongruous. Judicial independence is not furthered by the possibility of impeachment and removal, but
through that process certain forms of judicial misconduct can be
checked. The presence in the constitutional mix of a design principle therefore tells us almost nothing about the extent to which
its implementation will be limited because of possible abuse of
power.
The application of this fundamental meta-principle (a principle about the implementation of principles) to Congress's power
over jurisdiction is plain enough. That power is, among other
things, a check on the judiciary. Whether such a limitation on judicial authority should be in the Constitution is a question of design on which commentators differ. Whether it is in the Constitution, however, cannot be answered by the observation (itself
doubtful) that the Constitution reflects a design that federal jurisdiction extend as far as federal legislative power, any more
than the question whether the President may be temporarily

" It is no answer to point out that cases about small amounts of money may involve
major issues of law. That may be true, but whether resolution of every such question of
law justifies dragging one of the parties to a distant federal court is another question, one
the Constitution easily might leave to Congress. If questions of law cannot wait for a lawsuit that is worth a federal appeal, then the entire constitutional mechanism that limits
the courts' declarations of law to actual cases and controversies is a bad idea and questions of law should be decided in the abstract. That way lies a Council of Revision.
'There is nothing odd about the idea that the care of constitutional principles, especially constitutional principles that involve federal supremacy, may often safely be entrusted to Congress. Since 1789, Congress has largely looked favorably on the principle of
coextensiveness.
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removed for disability by a collegial body can be answered by the
observation that the presidency is unitary.13 9
Amar's arguments are alluring in part because they have
both a form and a content congenial to many commentators on
federal jurisdiction. The form is a reading that harmonizes the
Constitution with some theoretical principle. The content, the
theoretical principle, is that the federal courts are the special
guardians of the Constitution. Madison, however, cautioned us
that no theoretical principle is a substitute for a close examination of the Constitution's intricate clockwork.'4 God is in the
details.

' See US Const, Amend XXV (providing for temporary removal of President by Vice
President and principal officers of executive departments).
"See Letter from Madison to Webster (May 27, 1830), in 4 Writings of Madison at 85
(cited in note 115).

